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VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE
Abstract
With the lines between shareholders and corporations blurring over constitutional rights like free exercise of religion
and political speech, questions as to how and under what circumstances the law respects or disregards the separation
between shareholders and their corporations have never been more urgent. In the corporate law literature, these inquiries
have overwhelmingly focused on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, a judicial mechanism normally applied to
hold shareholders responsible for the obligations of corporations. The last twenty years of veil-piercing scholarship has
been largely devoted to empirical analyses of veil-piercing cases collected from Lexis and Westlaw searches. Since 1991,
scholars have been trying to mine cases for ever more variables that might predict when and under what circumstances
judges disregard the separation between shareholders and their corporations. This Article argues that these scholars have
focused on the substance of veil-piercing law to the detriment of another factor: civil procedure. This Article is the first to
survey civil procedure and evidentiary rules that affect existing veil-piercing studies including pleading standards, threshold
presumptions, burdens of proof, jury access and waiver. The Article ultimately argues that phenomena scholars now ascribe
to the “incoherence” of veil-piercing law are explicable in the context of veil-piercing's procedural fluidity.
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*1003  INTRODUCTION
After decades of invulnerability in state and federal courts, tobacco firms in the 1990s and 2000s began to face increasing
and potentially catastrophic liability over claims that they had hidden the risks of tobacco consumption (including risks
to non-users), manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes, intentionally misled consumers about the relative benefits of
“light” cigarettes, and, ultimately, imposed billions of dollars of health and other costs on consumers, governments
and insurers. 1  This liability was even more threatening at that time because the major tobacco firms were integrated
into diversified companies like Kraft, Nabisco, and B.A.T. Industries. 2  Directors and managers feared that successful
plaintiffs would not only bankrupt divisions dedicated to tobacco manufacturing, promotion, and distribution, but might
reach other corporate assets held by consumer products, brand management, or financial services units through the legal
doctrine known generally as “piercing the corporate veil.”
Legal scholars weighing in on the tobacco firms' fate overwhelmingly focused on the substantive law of veil-piercing and
advised the tobacco firms to house their tobacco businesses in separate corporate entities. Doing so, they claimed, would
protect non-tobacco assets. Columbia's Harvey Goldschmidt opined that formally separating tobacco-related businesses
from food units would make courts “more reluctant” to pierce the corporate veil. 3  Stanford's Joseph Grundfest
agreed noting that “absent anything extraordinary”, courts would not pierce if tobacco-related businesses were spun
off. 4  Renowned veil-piercing treatise author Stephen Presser argued that non-tobacco assets would be protected from
plaintiffs' claims as long as the firms made sure the tobacco businesses were not “controlled” by a parent corporation
and could prove that they were not segregating the businesses to evade existing liabilities. 5
To be sure, tobacco firms took scholars' advice seriously. An internal memorandum circulated after R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Holdings, Inc. was separated from Nabisco Group Holdings Corp. in 1999 ordered that every detail of corporate
separateness be observed:
*1004  It is critical that we not confuse third parties about which company is acting in a particular situation.
If the corporate separateness of Holdings and Tobacco is not maintained, a court could treat the two entities
as one and permit a plaintiff in a tobacco lawsuit to pierce the corporate veil and reach the parent company's
assets. 6
But tobacco firms did not limit their efforts at asset protection to restructuring their businesses or adopting veil-piercing
deterrent policies. They also played for the rules. In litigation across the country, tobacco firms argued that they enjoyed
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evidentiary presumptions, plaintiffs bore heightened burdens of proof, veil-piercing inquiries applied to procedural
aspects of litigation with the same force as underlying substantive claims, courts should reject corporate separateness as
a defendant's affirmative defense, and that plaintiffs should not have access to a jury on veil-piercing claims. 7  As early
as 1989, Philip Morris had developed a litigation manual on intercorporate liability, which set out strategies for both
substantive and procedural claims against veil-piercing. 8  Despite the importance tobacco firms attached to procedural
factors affecting veil-piercing, legal scholars neglected them.
This article addresses those factors, arguing in essence that the civil procedure of corporate veil-piercing has been
marginalized by advocates, scholars and judges alike. Indeed, in arguably the most important case of the Supreme Court's
2014 term, Justice Alito writing for the majority concluded that a “closely held” for-profit corporation was a person for
purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act without defining how or why a corporation might be considered
“closely held.” 9  In a stinging dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out the same problem, but limited her analysis to the
substantial consequences of giving for-profit corporations *1005  “personhood” under RFRA. 10  To be sure, Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. was a veil-piercing case. Hobby Lobby's controlling shareholders argued that they could
not comply with certain coverage mandates imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act “unless . . .
[they] personally direct[ed] the corporations to do so.” 11  Yet to both Alito and Ginsburg, the fundamental issue of
corporate separateness was masked behind a range of policy and statutory considerations. Neither mentioned state veil-
piercing law nor even clarified the relationship between state-incorporated entities and eligibility for federal religious
freedom protections. If they had done so, it would have exposed the unmanageable diversity and complexity involved in
separating corporations, their shareholder, and their managers in the closely held context.
This Article explores the procedural diversity that characterizes corporate veil-piercing, bringing to light the crucial role
civil procedure plays in veil-piercing adjudication and exposing weaknesses in current veil-piercing studies. Influenced
by Robert Thompson's pathbreaking study of veil-piercing in state and federal courts, veil-piercing scholars have since
1991 focused their research on collections of reported and unreported cases, examining the profiles of plaintiffs and
defendants; the type of claim (e.g. tort or contract) likeliest to prevail; the rate at which courts pierce; and the relative
importance of one factor or another in reaching veil-piercing conclusions. 12  This undertaking is vast. In their 2010
study of corporate veil piercing in federal courts, Christina Boyd and David Hoffman noted that there were “hundreds”
of articles on veil piercing. 13  When he revisited and refined Thompson's study, Peter Oh described the regular use
of scholars' veil-piercing research to *1006  shape judicial and legislative policy not only in the U.S. but around the
world. 14
Following Karl Llewellyn's admonition that “what substantive law says should be means nothing except in terms of
what procedure says that you can make real,” this article aims to shift the debate away from its current focus on parties
and substance, toward the process of piercing the corporate veil. 15  The reasons for doing so are two-fold. First, while
current empirical treatments attempt to assess the wide range of factors affecting veil-piercing outcomes, they tend to
either deemphasize or entirely ignore procedural variables that impact the success of veil-piercing claims. Neither state
nor federal procedure is uniform in how veil-piercing cases are adjudicated. Pleading standards, for example, range from
liberal notice to specific or heightened pleading for veil-piercing actions. Despite the recurrent mantra in the literature
that veil-piercing is an “equitable” doctrine, federal and state courts regularly submit the question of whether to pierce
the corporate veil to a jury and in at least 10 states and the District of Columbia, claimants enjoy a fairly clear right
to a jury trial on that issue. 16  Evidentiary standards and burdens also vary. Some states apply a preponderance of
the evidence standard while others impose a clear-and-convincing burden. 17  In some cases, courts presume corporate-
shareholder separation, requiring plaintiffs to plead and prove elements sufficient for a finding of piercing the corporate
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veil while others authorize or require the corporate veil to be raised as an affirmative defense. 18  As the question of
whether a corporation is separate from its owners or not metastasizes through an increasing number of state and federal
regulatory schemes, the processby which corporations are handled by judges will require more certainty and definition
than now prevails. 19
Second, the focus on parties and substance of corporate veil-piercing distracts from the universe of other options available
to litigants to combine shareholders and corporations for a wide range of reasons. In state jurisdictions where veil piercing
faces substantial procedural hurdles and/or no access to a jury, litigants resort to alternative claims including enterprise
liability, equitable subordination, fraudulent conveyance, theories of agency, and varieties of civil conspiracy claims to
reach shareholders. 20  Scholars, of course, have long been aware of these alternatives but have not *1007  systematically
studied their use as the result of the options civil procedure offers and shapes. These alternatives will similarly guide
relevant questions as to how shareholders may use the corporate veil as a “sword” against creditor claims but a “shield”
against regulatory measures.
Assessing the influence of rules of civil procedure may help in bringing clarity to curiosities that have emerged from
aggregate analyses. Maryland courts, known for their hostility to veil-piercing, work under rules which disallow veil-
piercing as an independent cause of action, generally provide no access to a jury's determination for veil-piercing
claims, and require a plaintiff to meet a clear-and-convincing standard of proof. 21  North Dakota courts, which oversee
one of the highest veil-piercing rates, apply liberal notice pleading to veil-piercing claims and subject them only to a
preponderance of the evidence burden. Existing narratives attribute the difference between Maryland and North Dakota
to the relative importance of “fraud” and “undercapitalization” as factors courts weigh in piercing the corporate veil. 22
The purpose of this Article is to identify and draw focus to the analytical difficulties implicit in empirical studies of veil
piercing that have not yet been adequately addressed. Experimental statistical treatments of cases culled from larger data
sets obtained through using search terms in Westlaw and Lexis seek to affirm or negate certain expectations through
correlations between variables. The classic case in the veil-piercing literature is the contract/tort distinction. Before
Thompson's study, scholars generally agreed that veil-piercing was easier in tort actions with the plausible explanation
that tort creditors were less able to protect themselves from abusive uses of the limited liability business entity. 23
Thompson's study upended the conventional wisdom, demonstrating, at least according to the methodology he applied,
that contract actions were more likely to result in a veil-piercing outcome. 24  Peter Oh's 2010 study suggested a return
to the conventional wisdom favoring tort actions by carefully categorizing actions for fraud, again based on whether a
plaintiff successfully reached shareholder assets. 25  Correlation, of course, is not causation and these and other studies
depend on whether any given researcher has correctly identified the relevant phenomena and controlled for alternative
possibilities. The most *1008  prominent studies of veil piercing focus on whetherthe veil is pierced in various contexts
e.g. contract, tort, closely held corporations, in a dispositive or discovery motion; upon a central veil-piercing theory e.g.
undercapitalization, commingling of funds, or failure to observe corporate formalities; and, applying a certain state's
law. Scholars have paid significantly less attention to how the veil is pierced.
Part I of this Article provides a brief summary of the law of veil-piercing and surveys the existing literature beginning with
Robert Thompson's 1991 article. This section of the Article demonstrates the general tendency of empirical veil-piercing
work to neglect procedural variables. Parts II and III survey, respectively, state and federal rules of civil procedure and
evidence for factors which influence the course of a veil-piercing claim: 1) must plaintiffs bring an independent cause of
action for piercing the corporate veil or is it a remedy for an underlying action? 2) if not specifically pled before trial,
is the claim waived? 3) if not waived, do the rules of civil procedure or evidence nevertheless encourage or discourage
veil-piercing plaintiffs to bring those claims toward the beginning of litigation? 4) which burden of proof must a litigant
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meet to prevail on veil-piercing claim or defense? 5) who determines whether the corporate veil will be pierced, the judge
or the jury? Part IV uses the procedural variables explored in Parts II and III to explain both why current empirical
treatments of veil-piercing tell us less than they might while simultaneously suggesting that some of the curiosities in
those studies may be understood as a function of the paths civil procedure shapes for veil-piercing claimants. In Part V,
I argue that, without accounting for procedural variables, existing empirical studies tell us little about either litigant or
judicial behavior relevant to veil-piercing disputes.
I. VEIL-PIERCING: AN OVERVIEW
When general corporation codes replaced the special state legislative charters that characterized the limited liability
entities of the 1800s, corporations shifted in the American economic, legal, and political landscape from unusual -
and highly circumscribed - beings created by the state to pedestrian entities with increasingly equal rights to natural
persons. 26  In recent years, this trend has accelerated as the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have extended
their rights - like political expression and free exercise of religion - normally ascribed to natural persons. 27  As a
corollary to *1009  their distinctness and independence, corporations' legal existence stands separate and apart from the
shareholders of the corporation, who in exchange for investment of their capital face limited consequences for corporate
debts and liabilities. “The purpose of such separation is to insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the corporation,
thus limiting their liability to only the amount that . . . [they] voluntarily put at risk.” 28  This “limited liability . . .
promote[s] commerce and industrial growth by encouraging shareholders to make capital contributions to corporations
without subjecting all their personal wealth to the risks of the business.” 29  The separation between shareholders and
corporations has facilitated some of the most important features of modern capitalism: efficient stock markets for the
trading of ownership interests; diversification of investment risk; subsidized risk-taking by corporate managers; and,
most importantly, enhanced capital flows to entrepreneurs. 30
The benefits flowing from the separation of shareholders and their corporations are accompanied by significant costs,
the management of which remain contested among legal scholars. 31  The separation of ownership and control empowers
corporate managers to act in their own interests at the expense of not only shareholders but other constituencies
like employees, communities, consumers, suppliers and other creditors. 32  The extent and management of those costs
manifest differently between corporations whose shares are publicly traded (and therefore are subject to at least some
level of market discipline) and those whose shares are closely held, often partially or wholly re-uniting ownership and
control in the same persons or entities. Indeed, it is the principle of control which undergirds the doctrine of veil-piercing,
which courts have, so far, only applied to closely held corporations. 33
*1010  Simply stated, veil-piercing allows courts to disregard the artificial “veil” separating shareholders and
corporations and allows a litigant to treat them as one for a range of reasons, the most common of which is the pool
of assets available to satisfy legal liabilities. 34  In the archetypal case, a shareholder, acting as a director, a manager, or
other ostensibly authorized agent of the corporation, will enter into a contract or commit a civil wrong attributable to
the corporation. A creditor (either contract or tort) will seek to recover from both the shareholder and the corporation
nominally responsible for the liability.
Veil-piercing, of course, is not the only legal theory under which shareholders and corporations may be unified for
legal purposes. Depending on factual context and procedural background, plaintiffs may pursue theories of agency,
aiding and abetting, a menu of equitable doctrines, civil conspiracy, enterprise liability, fraudulent conveyance, or
violation of statutory duties that effectively erase distinctions between regulation-violating, contract-breaching, and
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tort-perpetrating participants. 35  This in part explains the jurisprudential and scholarly frustration with the law of veil-
piercing. 36  Early courts borrowed concepts from agency law, applying the “alter ego” or “mere instrumentality” tests
when determining if the corporate form should be disregarded. 37  The core of veil-piercing law is actually remarkably
uniform across jurisdictions, requiring that a court find variations on “complete control and domination [and] . . .
a shareholder perpetuat[ing] a fraud, wrong, or injustice that has proximately caused unjust loss or injury to the
plaintiff.” 38  Jurisdictions have, to the consternation of judges, legislators and scholars alike, expanded the factors to be
considered for both the first “control” prong and the second “wrong” prong, while some jurisdictions have unevenly or
completely failed to apply causation as *1011  a requirement. 39
Because of these divergences and incongruities, the literature addressing veil-piercing is humorously indignant. Frank
Easterbook and Daniel Fischel quipped that “‘[p]iercing’ seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe,
and unprincipled.” 40  David Millon described veil-piercing as “incoherent.” 41  Stephen Presser recalls early scholars
who declared veil-piercing was “vague and illusory” and a “legal quagmire.” 42  Judicial opinions echo the scholarly
sentiment. 43  Legal scholars have advocated its abolition, its statutory codification, and even a return to its arguable
origin as a purely equitable remedy. 44
The criticism is sweeping and, frankly, unfair. Judges adjudicating veil-piercing claims clearly do so with regard for the
important policy rationales underlying the separation between shareholders and corporations. 45  Yet the doctrine itself
implicates both judges' duty to adhere to legislative mandates to respect the corporate veil and their more regular role in
shepherding civil disputes. Veil-piercing survived the major revolutions in federal and *1012  state civil procedure as an
equitable doctrine with features of an independent cause of action. As an equitable doctrine it should be available only
where there is no adequate remedy at law, but it often accompanies legal claims resolved by juries. Closely identified
with fraud, veil-piercing lends itself to the heightened standards of pleading demanded by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and many state procedural systems, the latter of which also regularly enhance evidentiary burdens for fraud
claims. 46  Within this procedural context, judges balance legislative admonitions to safeguard corporate-shareholder
separation with their own institutional interests in protecting equitable powers as well as equally potent constitutional
norms favoring jury determinations of fact. 47
A. Analytical Foci of Current Studies
While scholarly attention to veil-piercing long pre-dated Robert Thompson's path-breaking veil-piercing study, his was
the first to systematically collect instances where courts applied the doctrine, distribute those instances into discrete
categories, and draw conclusions based on aggregate data, although he urged care in the use of those conclusions for
any firm policy or jurisprudential decision-making. 48  Some of Thompson's findings dovetailed with the observations
and expectations of corporate law commentators. For example, courts pierced only against closely held corporations
and never against publicly traded corporations; pierced more against individual shareholders than collective groups of
shareholders; and, government plaintiffs succeeded in veil-piercing claims more readily than private parties. 49  Other
findings challenged the conventional wisdom, especially the differences between successful actions in contract versus
tort (42% to 31% respectively) and the greater likelihood that the assets of individual, rather than corporate, *1013
shareholders would be reached. 50
Thompson's study exercised an enormous influence over not only policy and jurisprudential decision-making, but
scholars' approach to veil-piercing research. After 1991, scholars, including Thompson himself, began assembling larger
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collections of cases to determine which veil-piercing factors courts based their decisions on most frequently, which state
laws were most and least friendly to veil-piercing, and whether a certain kind of party (e.g. individual or corporate)
enjoyed greater success. 51  Thompson updated his findings in 1995, adding 2200 cases, slightly modifying his categories
but ultimately determining that “the recent data indicates that these results fit within the pattern of the original
study.” 52  John Matheson applied a multiple logistic regression analysis to a smaller collection of cases, determining
that Thompson's conclusions, inter alia, understated courts' preferences for (1) piercing to reach individual rather than
corporate shareholders and, (2) finding in favor of corporate (or entity) plaintiffs far more than individual plaintiffs. 53
Matheson analyzed cases covering a longer time span, but ultimately examined far fewer cases because he excluded cases
that “1) failed to reach the merits of the piercing issue; 2) had a statutory basis for piercing; 3) pierced to gain jurisdiction
over a party; 4) constituted horizontal piercing; or 5) constituted reverse piercing.” 54  Several additional studies aimed
at revising or updating Thompson's methodology specifically. 55  Others examined only one veil-piercing factor or issue-
area for which courts had used veil-piercing. John Swain and Edwin Aguilar, for example, collected cases specific to the
use of veil-piercing to exercise personal jurisdiction over affiliate corporations. 56
In 2010, Christina Boyd and David Hoffman published their analysis of veil-piercing, focusing not on the ultimate
conclusions of state and federal courts, but rather examining the dockets of federal district courts between 2000 and 2005
and including veil-piercing arguments raised in
*1014  preliminary motion practice, during discovery, at summary judgment, at trial, or in post-trial
practice. [They] also analyzed the significant non-veil piercing motion practice in each case as a control.
The resulting database consists of a set of observations which speak to the life of veil piercing law, rather
than the gauzy rationalizations presented by judges' written opinions. 57
Boyd and Hoffman also coded for factors like judicial characteristics and ideology. 58  While their article uniquely
assessed the relevance of legal and non-legal factors (e.g. defendant's size and judicial ideology), other determinations
supported previous empirical work including the association of undercapitalization and contract actions with veil-
piercing success. 59  Most recently, Peter Oh revisited Thompson's methodology aiming at explaining the counterintuitive
outcomes for veil-piercing actions in contract or tort (or, more flexibly, voluntary versus involuntary creditor claims). 60
Claiming to have assembled “the most comprehensive portrait of veil-piercing decisions yet,” Oh examined the presence
and context of fraud as a veil-piercing ground, finding not only that tort-based veil-piercing claims succeed at a higher
rate than contract claims, but that this tort success obtained even without accounting for fraud and in Thompson's
original timeframe. 61
B. The Neglect of Procedural Variables
Scholars are certainly aware that the civil procedure of veil-piercing matters, even if they do not necessarily account
for the procedural diversity that characterizes veil-piercing claims. Arguably, Boyd's and Hoffman's most important
contribution is that they examined entire dockets, conscious that veil-piercing disputes arise in “fighting off a defendant's
motion to dismiss veil piercing allegations; obtaining veil piercing-related discovery from a shareholder; keeping a case in
federal court on the ground that two purportedly different parties might really be one; and, most importantly, surviving
summary judgment.” 62  Similarly, Peter Oh's greatest contribution to the current debate may be his focus on the issue
of fraud and how its use as a contract or tort theory in litigation may affect aggregate outcomes. 63  John Matheson's
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2009 study focused on the (growing) list of factors courts consider when deciding whether to pierce the corporate
veil-commingling of funds, undercapitalization, failure to observe formalities, and others-and *1015  which of those
effectively signaled likely success for veil-piercing plaintiffs. 64
Yet for this awareness, civil procedure remains curiously sidelined. Boyd's and Hoffman's analysis is limited to data
obtained from federal court litigation between 2000 and 2005, so the conclusions they draw apply to the roughly 30%
of veil piercing cases adjudicated in federal courts. 65  The vast majority of veil-piercing cases, of course, are handled
by state judges under state rules of civil procedure. 66  Even within their data set, litigation in federal court is impliedly
uniform when the reality is far different. 67  Federal district courts sitting in diversity, for example, have applied a range
of pleading standards to veil-piercing cases, even before the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 68  and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 69  significantly complicated the pleading standards picture. District courts sitting in
the Seventh Circuit are bound to apply that court's decision that veil-piercing claims are not covered by the Seventh
Amendment while district courts in the Second Circuit must give claimants a right to a jury trial on veil-piercing claims. 70
While almost certainly influencing the commencement, course and resolution of veil-piercing claims, these variables
disappear in current analyses with no obvious effort to identify them or variables that might serve as proxies. John
Matheson, for example, only examined cases where a court reached the merits of a veil-piercing claim, thus including
cases from jurisdictions where veil-piercing may or must be brought along with related claims, but excluding cases where
a claimant must exhaust other legal theories like breach of fiduciary duty. 71  Peter Oh is to be credited with emphasizing
the role of fraud in veil-piercing cases, but without assessing evidentiary standards under which fraud is adjudicated
by triers of fact, his insight may tell us little about veil-piercing and more about the relative ease of bringing fraud
actions in different jurisdictions. He *1016  further assumes that “veil-piercing is a remedial instrument for satisfying a
judgment that stands apart from a matter's substantive cause(s) of action” but in the many jurisdictions that require or
goad plaintiffs to bring veil-piercing actions early in litigation, veil-piercing shapes the entire dispute and, in fact, may
play a role in settlement that Thompson, Oh, Boyd, and Hoffman concede challenges any empirical analysis of veil-
piercing to date. 72
II. VEIL-PIERCING AND THE RELEVANCE OF PROCEDURE
Because of the questions they ask, scholars tend to ascribe to veil-piercing a kind of procedural homogeneity. In the
typical depiction, veil-piercing is an “equitable remedy” exercised by a judge at the end of litigation when a judgment
for a corporate creditor remains unsatisfied and the relative involvement of one or more shareholders in the underlying
contract breach or tort is assessed under a presumably uniform although unstated burden of proof. It is unsurprising,
then, that when it is studied with these legal priors implicitly or explicitly informing the inquiry, it appears unpredictable
and incoherent.
The reality is that veil-piercing claims run the gamut from free-standing causes of action (which under the law of waiver
in some jurisdictions must be pleaded early in litigation) to affirmative defenses to, indeed, equitable remedies enforced
at the end of litigation. Those claims or the claims to which they are tied are subject to burdens of proof ranging from
preponderance of the evidence to clear-and-convincing evidence, which may or may not, in turn, be a proper subject for
accepting expert testimony. State jurisdictions have developed separate causes of action applicable to individual versus
corporate defendants in veil-piercing cases. Many jurisdictions place the decision as to veil-piercing in the hands of the
jury, not the judge, inevitably influencing a number of factors, *1017  including predisposition toward settlement. 73
These nuances leach into federal district courts through the obligations imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie
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Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, effectively requiring federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and substantive state law. 74  The procedure/substance dichotomy spawned by Erieand
its progeny poses problems for the conclusions advanced in the existing veil-piercing literature, even studies as careful
and comprehensive as Boyd's and Hoffman's.
A. Veil-Piercing as Pleading and Presumption
1. Veil-Piercing as Cause of Action or Affirmative Defense
It is fitting that as a judicial device to allocate the risk society bears for its grant of limited liability to entrepreneurs, it
is equally plausible that plaintiffs and defendants might bear the initial burden of proving or disproving the corporate
integrity limited liability demands. In other words, it makes as much sense to require that defendants plead and prove
their adherence to state incorporation requirements as an affirmative defense to shareholder liability as to require creditor
plaintiffs to bear the burden of pleading and proving each element of a claim that shareholder defendants have failed to
so perform. In a famous essay on this choice, Edward Cleary identified three general criteria courts use: policy, fairness,
and probability. 75
As a condition of obtaining limited liability, corporations must file a certificate of incorporation with state agencies,
typically the secretary of state, 76  providing potential veil-piercing claimants with a substantial amount of inexpensive
information as to shareholders and interested parties. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1, although aimed primarily at
judicial integrity, requires corporate parties to identify parent corporations and imposes an ongoing obligation to inform
the court of changes, allowing veil-piercing litigants' attorneys to expand their investigations into broader corporate
families. 77  Some states have adopted mirror provisions of FRCP 7.1. 78  Moreover, at least for contract creditors,
shareholders are frequently required to personally guarantee the performance of business obligations, *1018  especially
debt. 79  State legislatures are fairly uniform in their statements that judges keep shareholders and the corporations they
own legally separate, and some affirmatively excuse the failure to observe corporate formalities for adjudicating questions
regarding corporation/shareholder separation. 80  Policy and fairness rationales therefore counsel that plaintiffs bear an
initial burden to plead and prove claims asserting that shareholders and corporate entities be united for certain legal
purposes.
On the other hand, outside the formal filing requirements, state statutes impose on corporations annual meeting
requirements (or decision-making alternatives that require notice and written evidence), annual filing statements that
vary in level of detail, and running obligations to make books and records available for shareholder inspection. 81
Because these obligations appear to be part of the grand bargain for limited liability, a “probabilistic” inquiry suggests
that most corporations observe these and other corporate formalities most of the time. Shareholders, especially
controlling shareholders, might be justifiably expected to bear the initial burden of pleading and proving incorporation
and related practices as an affirmative defense.
Indeed, divergence in state procedure manifests along not only the plaintiffs' and defendants' initial burdens but along
other axes that effectively shift the pleading and presumption burdens between movants and opponents of veil-piercing
actions. 82  In Louisiana's First Circuit, for example, a shareholder may assert the corporate shield as a defense to liability,
but in doing so bears the initial burden of proving the existence of the corporation and may carry this burden by the
use of corporate charter or other documents. 83  If the shareholder is successful, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the corporate form *1019  should be disregarded. 84  Similarly, a corporate
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE, 67 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1001
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10
veil defense has been raised in Idaho, 85  Ohio, 86  and Texas 87  and allowed as a possibility in Utah. 88  The allocation of
an initial pleading burden may depend on the nature of the dispute and whether a governmental or non-governmental
party is involved. 89
2. Legal Claim or Equitable Remedy
Similarly, parties urging a court to disregard the veil between the corporation and its shareholders may be required to
raise the issue early in the litigation or have it deemed waived or precluded; other jurisdictions may allow or require a
prevailing party to request that judges exercise their equitable powers to grant relief, presumably doing so because there
is no adequate remedy at law. This dichotomy is complicated further in jurisdictions that either maintain the division
between courts of equity and law or where their merger is incomplete. Analysts frequently assume that veil-piercing
occurs at the end of prior litigation, as an “equitable remedy” applied when liability for a contract, tort or other action
has been established. Peter Oh, for example, citing a 1992 Texas appellate court decision, writes that “veil-piercing is
a remedial instrument for satisfying a judgment that stands apart from a matter's substantive cause(s) of action; a veil-
piercing request is thus among the last things courts tend to hear within a dispute.” 90  There is no obvious reason why
this would even ordinarily be the case.
As with initial pleading burdens, the requirement that a party bring a veil-piercing claim or the availability of veil-piercing
as strictly equitable relief is plausibly driven by a number of policy and fairness considerations. Plaintiffs and their
attorneys are often aware or at little expense could become aware with the commencement of litigation that ownership
and control behind a given dispute may involve a complex web of corporate and individual parties. The general set of
sanctions rules of civil procedure impose *1020  for failure to reasonably bring as many claims and parties together in
the same dispute shouldcounsel toward a requirement that veil-piercing be pleaded early in litigation. 91
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, veil-piercing elements must be pled before trial or they are waived. 92  In Lipp v. Bruce, the
plaintiffs did not assert a cause of action alleging facts which would support a claim for piercing the corporate veil until
responding to a motion for summary judgment. 93  The Michigan appellate court found that the plaintiffs had waived
any ground for such an assertion and were not allowed to make a showing of the elements for piercing the corporate
veil. 94  In Shockley v. Harry Sander Realty Co., the plaintiff filed its action against the defendants before the limitations
period had run on the underlying liability claim and successfully obtained a judgment. 95  When the judgment remained
unsatisfied after execution, the plaintiff filed another lawsuit seeking to pierce the corporate veil. In finding that the
limitations period had passed on the piercing claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that the defendants should
have joined the veil-piercing request with their initial action. 96
Many jurisdictions, it is true, have selected the alternative course allowing judgment creditors to bring subsequent actions
in equity, although for varying reasons. 97  Some states which have concluded that piercing the corporate veil is not an
independent cause of action 98  have done so in reliance on § 41.10 of Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations
which states that standing *1021  alone “[veil-piercing] creates no cause of action.” 99  Alabama, 100  Massachusetts, 101
and New York, for example, have explicitly invoked Fletcher's treatise as authority for refusing to recognize veil-piercing
as a cause of action separate from claims against the corporation generally. 102  Others locate the rationale squarely
within the procedural context, distinguishing the “substantive” law of the related contract, tort or equitable action. 103
Still others tie their refusal to acknowledge an independent cause of action for veil-piercing as a function of the statutory
demand for limited liability prevailing over the less democratic but important equitable powers of judges. 104
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE, 67 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1001
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11
Most jurisdictions, however, ascribe no firm or consistent rationale, or allow veil-piercing claims to proceed as
independent causes of action without any discussion as to their substantive or procedural origin. 105  Clearly wrestling
with the question as a matter of Arizona law, a federal district court concluded that “[t]he Court could not find an
Arizona case specifically addressing whether an alter ego claim is a separate and distinct cause of action that can stand
alone.” 106  The court noted that dicta from several Arizona cases *1022  suggest that a party may bring a separate veil
piercing claim. 107  In Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, the Colorado Court of Appeals noted:
The complaint sufficiently identifies the transactions involved in this case and states that “the individual
defendants are named in their individual capacities.” It alleges that Trowbridge “participated in the
torts through direct involvement in the wrongful conduct of the [LLCs], including specific authorization,
direction, active participation, or cooperation in the wrongful conduct that is alleged in this complaint.”
It also alleges Trowbridge engaged in wrongful transfers of distributions and income he received from the
LLCs to others despite the LLCs' existing obligations to Sheffield. 108
The case implies not only that a veil-piercing action is an independent claim, but, in that case, that it can be
tried even without being specifically pled. In Krause v. Great Lakes Holdings, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court
explicitly acknowledged that, depending on context, veil-piercing claims may constitute independent causes of action or
“amplifications” of prior actions under Pennsylvania law. 109
Even jurisdictions that do not punish veil-piercing claimants for failing to raise veil piercing in the initial action create
procedural loopholes by which they may circumvent the requirement to obtain a prior judgment. By statute, piercing
the corporate veil under Kansas law is allowed in the limited circumstance where judgment has been obtained against
the corporation and the execution thereon is unsatisfactory. 110  However, Kansas courts have crafted an exception to
the statute where obtaining a prior judgment would be impracticable. 111  In doing so, the courts have created a quasi-
*1023  independent cause of action for veil-piercing which may accompany other legal claims.
Thus, rules of civil procedure can be seen as exercising at least three influences on when and how veil-piercing claims
are adjudicated. They may be specifically authorized as independent causes of action which must be pled before trial
along with related claims or abandoned by virtue of statutes of limitations, waiver, or res judicata. Veil-piercing may
be authorized purely as an equitable remedy unavailable until it is evident that there is no adequate remedy at law, i.e.,
a previous judgment remains unsatisfied. 112  Finally, a veil-piercing claim may exist principally as a remedy but with
sufficient potential procedural sanctions so that litigants are encouraged to bring the claim early in litigation. 113  For
example, in Texas, where a post-judgment suit for veil-piercing is not typically barred by res judicata, a subsequent suit
may be precluded if prior litigation resulted in the adjudication of a relevant material fact. 114  So, even though veil-
piercing is technically a remedy under Texas law, 115  it is procedurally encouraged to be brought along with related
contract, tort and statutory claims. 116  In other jurisdictions, the process by which the division between actions at law
or in equity was maintained, merged or otherwise managed, influences the course of veil-piercing claims. For example,
in Delaware, veil-piercing must be brought as an action in equity, so that a litigant who successfully obtains an action
at law must nevertheless turn to the chancery courts for relief under a veil-piercing theory. 117
3. Notice Versus Specific Pleading
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Within the jurisdictions that either require or encourage veil-piercing claims to accompany other claims against
corporations and their shareholders, pleading standards vary in their stringency. 118  At *1024  one end, and closely
associated with jurisdictions that empirical studies have assessed as liberal with respect to veil-piercing outcomes, is
simple notice pleading without specific or separate allegations as to a veil-piercing or alter ego theory. 119  In North
Dakota, for example, under the state's “liberal pleading rules,” plaintiffs are not even required to plead with specificity
the facts supporting their claim or the factors considered in piercing the corporate veil. 120  In Indiana, a party may prevail
on a veil-piercing claim not raised in the pleadings but tried by express or implied consent. 121  Similarly, at least one
Ohio jurisdiction effectively adopted Wright & Miller's treatise standard for notice pleading even in veil piercing claims:
the complaint, and other relief-claiming pleadings need not state with precision all elements that give rise to
a legal basis for recovery as long as fair notice of the nature of the action is provided. However, the complaint
must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery on any legal
theory, even though it may not be the theory suggested or intended by the pleader, or contain allegations
from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial.
(emphasis in original). 122
Thompson and Oh both assign Indiana and North Dakota law a veil-piercing rate of greater than 60% and Ohio greater
than 55% without assessing the influence pleading standards may exercise. Thompson notes the success of “conclusory”
reasons courts offered when deciding to pierce. 123  As examples, he uses the number of times *1025  courts mention
“instrumentality” and “alter ego” and their evident tie to high veil piercing rates. 124  Yet “conclusory” allegations are to
some extent what notice pleading jurisdictions allow. The predicted effect would be a disproportionate number of cases
from notice pleading jurisdictions, a variable no current study assesses.
Other jurisdictions, especially those which closely tie veil-piercing to fraud, impose heightened pleading standards. In
Maryland, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil to redress fraud or “to protect a paramount
equity.” 125  Since no party has successfully brought a claim under the latter theory, veil-piercing actions are essentially
held to the heightened pleading (and proof) standards Maryland courts require for fraud actions. 126  In New York,
at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must set forth “sufficiently [particularized] statements” showing that the person or
persons who are in control of the corporation “are actually doing business in their individual capacities . . . .” 127  As
part of its broad attempt to unify disparate practices in Oregon trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Oregon
required any theory of recovery, especially veil-piercing, to be separately and specifically pleaded. 128  In De La Fontaine
Warehouses, Inc. v. Lang, a complaint which alleged facts to support two veil-piercing factors was insufficiently pled
because it contained no facts to support a finding that the corporation was used to commit fraud or that equity required
veil-piercing. 129
Indeed, even in the federal court system where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should theoretically smooth out
pleading variation, there is substantial divergence as to whether veil-piercing plaintiffs must plead veil piercing or waive
the right to raise those claims in the litigation. Boyd and Hoffman, for example, argue that “requiring the pleading
of a piercing claim (including in amendments) is the majority rule” citing ten federal court cases but in discussing the
minority rule identify three federal district courts which allowed veil-[HD] *1026  piercing claims based on liberal notice
pleading. 130  Although it is not clear what method they used to determine “majority” and “minority” rules, even if they
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are ultimately correct, the minority view is a considerable one which, as they concede, may under represent successful
veil-piercing efforts in these “lenient” jurisdictions. This is one of several distortions arising from Erie discussed below.
B. Elements of Veil-Piercing Claims
Despite the influences civil procedure exercises over when and how veil-piercing claims may be brought, corporate law
scholars, treatise-writers, and empirical observers have overwhelmingly focused on the core inquiry courts undertake
when deciding whether, and under what circumstances, to pierce the corporate veil, emphasizing the evident arbitrariness
in applying those inquiries. 131  Those venturing into the subject after 1985 are obliged to quote Easterbook and Fischel's
pithy phrase equating veil-piercing to lightning for its mystery and unpredictability. 132  The subtext of these criticisms
almost always implicates judges themselves. Presser, for example, argues that veil-piercing is “a doctrine applied by
courts in an extremely discretionary manner, in accordance with the individual conscience of judges.” 133
Given the frustration scholars express over the unpredictability of veil-piercing, it is surprising that the scholarly inquiry
has focused on the aspect of veil-piercing over which there is broad agreement. Ever since Frederick J. Powell sought to
codify and expand Maurice Wormser's normative work as to when the corporate veil should or should not be pierced,
(a phrase Wormser is crediting with popularizing), Powell's three-part test has generally been asserted as representative
of what courts actually do. Powell's “rule” allows courts to pierce the corporate veil, provided a court find “complete
control and domination, [by] a shareholder . . . perpetuat[ing] a fraud, wrong, or injustice that has proximately caused
unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff” . 134  Powell further compiled the inquiries courts undertook within each of the three
parts of the test, including ownership of stock, overlapping directors and officers, undercapitalization, commingling of
corporate and shareholder funds *1027  and property, and observation of corporate formalities. 135  In a seminal article
on the history of the debate, Cathy and James Krendl wrote that Powell's formulation “is of interest, not only because it
is perhaps the most frequently applied and most clearly articulated of the rules in the corporate veil area, but also because
its parts include most of the other rules in this area.” 136  Robert Thompson and Charles O'Kelley note that “judicial
and academic [commentators] have expanded and re-arranged [Powell's] lists, and most court opinions are structured so
as to give the appearance that the court has actually applied the test and the factors.” 137  Peter Oh similarly identifies
Powell's test as the “most common” veil-piercing test. 138
To be sure, there are indeterminacies within Powell's framework. Undercapitalization, for example, may independently
show that a shareholder controlled the corporation (e.g. it was undercapitalized because a controlling shareholder
siphoned away its funds); that the undercapitalization itself served as the wrong committed (e.g. a corporation undertook
excessively risky activities without adequate self or second-party insurance to adequately protect the public against those
risks); and, that the undercapitalization was the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury (e.g. there would be no veil-piercing
action but for a judgment the corporation could not satisfy).
It is not clear, however, that this indeterminacy ultimately explains veil-piercing's unpredictability. Indeed, it is a subtle
but important assumption of this paper that the elements of veil-piercing claims are, as commentators have noted,
relatively uniform. 139  Part of the problem with the existing literature is that scholars place these elements at the core of
their inquiry, seeking to explain why if the elements are uniform the outcomes are not. 140  As I noted in the discussion
of pleading and presumption above, the availability of the corporate form itself implicates a deal between entrepreneurs
and society which is reflected in procedural variation when that deal is in dispute. In this Part, my intent is not to re-hash
the debate over core veil-piercing inquiries, but only to survey the ways in which civil procedure shapes those inquiries.
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Because few states have codified veil-piercing tests, courts are often left to decide whether, and under what conditions,
veil-piercing claims may proceed. 141
*1028  1. Distinctions between Corporate and Natural Person Shareholders
One of Thompson's findings which surprised corporate law scholars was that courts within his dataset pierced to reach
individuals more frequently than they pierced to reach corporate shareholders. 142  But many jurisdictions make available
additional legal theories tailored to suits against corporate families, especially in the tort context. The result is that
actions that successfully unify shareholder and corporate assets may not be caught by the database searches current
studies employ. This may explain why success against individual shareholders occurs at a disproportionately higher rate
in these study results.
In Georgia, veil-piercing theories against individuals and corporate groups are divided, respectively, into “alter ego” and
“business conduit” tests. 143  While Georgia courts have over time collapsed the inquiries related to these kinds of suits,
the nominal distinction remains. 144
The business conduit theory relates to the activities of two or more corporations, usually a parent and its
subsidiary, which operate in such a manner that the subsidiary corporation retains insufficient earnings to
finance its activities and pay its obligations. In such instances, the profits are channeled to the parent, while
the obligations remain with the undercapitalized subsidiary. The alter ego doctrine arises where the parent
corporation or corporate officers, directors or stockholders disregard the corporate entity by commingling
and confusing their personal affairs and business with those of the corporation, treating the corporate
property as their own. 145
Similarly, in Massachusetts, different tests apply to a single enterprise theory of corporate liability versus suits to reach
the assets of individual shareholders. A mix of state and federal courts applying Massachusetts law suggest that while a
showing of fraud or improper purpose is required for the latter, the former relies more *1029  generally on principles
of agency, and the two inquiries differ in key respects. 146
In Texas, individual shareholders were not included in one of the earlier and most quoted formulations of the rule; 147  and
until 2009, which covers nearly the entire time frame under which empirical studies of veil-piercing cases were conducted,
a “single business enterprise” theory in Texas allowed plaintiffs to aggregate corporate groups for liability purposes. 148
Even after the Supreme Court of Texas spoke specifically to the single business enterprise theory in SSP Partners v.
Gladstrong Investments, 149  Texas courts appear to continue to allow the theory-- without accompanying veil-piercing
claims--to apply to negligence cases involving corporate groups. 150  California has similarly adopted the single business
enterprise theory to apply to sibling corporations, while alter ego liability applies in the parent-subsidiary context. 151  In
Louisiana, a separate single business enterprise theory applies to corporate siblings and parents, with components of the
test that are “similar” to other veil-piercing inquiries, but ultimately hinge on a determination that “When a group of . . .
corporations integrate their resources to achieve a common business purpose” and do not operate as separate entities,
each affiliated corporation may be held liable “for debts incurred in pursuit of the . . . general business purpose.” 152  This
standard is similar for liability associated with a joint venture, available in most states, although not uniformly defined.
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2. Distinctions between Contract, Tort and Other Claims
Veil-piercing theories may be based on the breach of a number of *1030  legal duties, including those imposed by virtue of
a contract or other enforceable agreement, by courts and common law doctrine like negligence and intentional torts, and
by regulations and statutes covering a range of industry sectors including construction, consumer products, employment,
financial instruments, insurance, medical services, motor carriers, natural resource extraction, tax, transportation, and
workers' compensation. 153  In the case of the latter class of legal obligations, states are not uniform in the range of
industries they regulate, the extent to which they regulate those sectors, nor the associated contractual relationships and
public interests connected to those sectors. Generally speaking, “[i]n the field of . . . tax legislation, courts have generally
refused, for various reasons, to separate the corporate entities of the parent company and the wholly owned subsidiary
in order to grant relief from such taxes at the expense of the state.” 154  This multiplicity alone brings into doubt the
wisdom of studying aggregations of veil-piercing cases.
To the extent that veil-piercing can be accurately or effectively characterized as an equitable remedy, it should only be
available where there is no adequate legal remedy otherwise provided by statutes or common law rules specific to these
issue-areas. 155  This is why in Illinois a plaintiff may not sustain a veil-piercing action against a controlling shareholder
where an alternative claim for breach of fiduciary duty against that shareholder is available. 156  It similarly explains why
a subcontractor in Massachusetts may not pierce the corporate veil of a general contractor if it does not avail itself of
alternative procedural or statutory protections. 157
Nevertheless, the general distinctions between contract, tort, voluntary and involuntary creditors, statutory, and criminal
veil-piercing actions pervade the literature with “the distinction between common law contract and tort creditors . . . a
major fault line in the law of veil piercing.” 158  Thompson upended the conventional wisdom *1031  by finding that
contract creditors prevailed in veil-piercing actions at a higher rate than tort creditors, although subsequent research has
not confirmed his findings. 159  Peter Oh's recent analysis found a substantial discrepancy toward tort creditors even in
Thompson's original time period. 160  More importantly, Oh broke new ground on the role of fraud claims in shaping
scholars' analyses of tort versus creditor claims, separately examining fraud as a hybrid claim that further confused the
contract/tort landscape. 161
But even with these nuances in the literature, the contract/tort distinction is explicit in the laws of states like Texas and
West Virginia, and it plays a jurisprudentially relevant role for other states as well. 162  The result is that aggregating
veil-piercing outcomes for cases adjudicating contract and tort actions obscures relevant legal or evidentiary distinctions
between them.
Even before the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas legislature substantially altered the veil-piercing landscape
between 1986 and 1989, contract and tort actions were subjected to different standards by courts. 163  In their analysis
of Texas veil-piercing cases, Hamilton, Miller, and Ragazzo found that in contract cases, courts generally concluded
that third party creditors were better positioned to bear contracting risk and therefore piercing inquiries focused on
the integrity of the ex ante bargaining process or particularly egregious ex post conduct. 164  In tort cases, Texas courts
allowed risk to be shifted to corporations based on the following factors:
(i) the adequacy of the capitalization of the corporation in light of the nature and risks of the business being
engaged in, (ii) whether available corporate funds had been responsibility utilized to provide a reasonable
degree of protection to third persons tortiously injured by corporate action, typically through the purchase
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of liability insurance, or (iii) whether there was misuse or excessive distributions of assets to shareholders,
either directly or *1032  indirectly. 165
In 1986, the Texas Supreme Court decided Castleberry v. Branscum, 166  which significantly expanded the grounds upon
which shareholder assets might be reached as well as concluding for the first time that veil-piercing was a question for a
jury. 167  In a dispute in which two business partners secretly established a competing business and then diverted business
using the first corporation's assets, the Supreme Court of Texas used the case to establish the availability of veil-piercing
in a wide range of legal situations. 168
The Court then set forth a broad veil-piercing test allowing Texas courts to disregard the corporate fiction, “‘even though
corporate formalities have been observed and [the] corporate and individual property have been kept separately,’ when
the corporate form [has been] used ‘as part of a basically unfair device to achieve an inequitable result.”’ 169  “To prove
there has been a sham to perpetrate a fraud, tort claimants and contract creditors must show only constructive fraud . . .
the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its
tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure public interests.” 170
The Court furthermore clarified that a veil-piercing determination was squarely the province of the jury. 171
Following the Castleberry decision, the Texas legislature amended article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act in
1989. 172  The Texas legislature expressly made piercing to satisfy contractual obligations impossible without a showing
of actual fraud, although constructive fraud remains a valid theory for tort actions. 173
*1033  In West Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted as part of its veil-piercing test an inquiry as to whether
a party could effectively investigate a corporate counterparty's financial health and contractually secure its interests. 174
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine similarly imposed “a more stringent standard of proof to a contract creditor of
the corporation” than a tort creditor. 175  In Illinois, this distinction is even more specific in the landlord-tenant context
where a party that enters into a lease with a corporation as counter-party is estopped from denying the corporation's
separate existence. 176  Many jurisdictions do not specify particular differences in their three-part tests but allow generally
for heightened review in contract cases. 177
Other jurisdictions, of course, specifically include and equate both contract and tort actions in veil-piercing decisions. 178
Yet whether or not courts apply different tests to contract or tort claims is not acknowledged in many of the most
influential empirical studies.
3. Undercapitalization and Expert Testimony
Although not strictly a matter of procedure or evidence, undercapitalization is treated uniformly in studies to date. 179
Yet the reasons and evidentiary context of undercapitalization claims influences not only the likelihood of veil-piercing
success, but also whether undercapitalization sounds principally in contract or tort. 180  For example, in Laya v. Erin
Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court of West Virginia specifically recognized the necessity for expert testimony on the issue
of adequate capitalization:
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For example, comparison with the capitalization of other corporations in the same or a similar line
of business may be made. The capitalization of the corporation in question could be compared with
the average industry-wide ratios (current ratio, acid-test ratio, debt/equity ratio, etc.) obtained from
published sources (Dunn & Bradstreet, Moody's Manual of Investments, Standard and Poor's Corporation
Records, etc.). These average ratios could be *1034  buttressed by expert testimony from certified public
accountants, securities analysts, investment counselors or other qualified financial analysts. “Grossly
inadequate capitalization” for the purpose of piercing the corporate veil would generally be reflected by a
substantial deficiency of capital compared with that level of capitalization deemed adequate in the case by
the financial analyst experts. 181
In the Collet case, the Missouri Court of Appeals reasoned that capital was inadequate because it was below industry
standards. 182  In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: “Plaintiff's experts, whose testimony was accepted by the
trial court, clearly testified [the defendant's] capitalization was far below industry standards.” 183
These courts, in essence, applied a level of care standard to capitalization levels, a standard that corresponds with a
negligence action. The role of expert testimony in establishing an industry standard appears relevant if not decisive.
Compare these “negligence” undercapitalization cases with of the type occurring in Consumer's Co-op of Walworth
County v. Olsen, in which a contract creditor asserted undercapitalization as a basis to pierce even though the creditor
continued to allow the defendant to purchase in violation of its own contractual terms. 184  The court refused to pierce
the veil on the basis of undercapitalization, noting that contract creditors should investigate risks involved in dealing
with the defendant creditor. 185
C. Evidentiary Burdens
Just as pleading standards and presumptions shape the availability and course of veil-piercing claims in influential ways
not adequately recognized in current studies, evidentiary burdens and standards not only shape disputes but also reflect
social choices about the strength of the legal separation between shareholders and corporations. 186  Burdens of proof
represent a choice to allocate the risk of an erroneous decision between the parties. 187  A preponderance *1035  of
the evidence standard, commonly applied in veil-piercing cases, suggests that society accepts equally the chance that a
judge or a jury may reach the wrong conclusion as between a damaged party and a shareholder who relied on the legal
separation between herself and the corporation. A reasonable doubt standard, most frequently applied in the criminal
context, allocates the risk of loss away from the defendant, reflecting a strong desire for the wrongfully accused to be
found innocent, even if it also results in the exoneration of some guilty defendants. A “clear and convincing” standard
lies in between, imposing on the party who bears it a burden to produce in the mind of the judge or jury “a firm belief
or conviction” or similar level of persuasion as to the allegations made. 188  It is typically used “in civil cases involving
allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.” 189
The distinction between the burdens of proof that veil-piercing parties bear and the claims which accompany or underlie a
veil-piercing action frequently blurs. If a jurisdiction requires a finding of fraud as a precondition to piercing; a heightened
pleading standard for fraud; and, a clear-and-convincing burden of proof for fraud, it has gone far toward closing the
door altogether on veil-piercing purely as a procedural matter. Given the diversity of perspectives on the fundamental
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE, 67 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1001
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 18
deal struck between society and entrepreneurs, it is no surprise that those perspectives are reflected in legal standards
that inevitably allocate resources either toward protecting corporate/shareholder separation or circumscribing its use.
These distinctions, if they are considered, are not obvious in the literature. Thompson, for example, locates variation
in courts' veil-piercing behavior “with the context, and decisions [that] reflect the differing impact of various statutory
policies affecting limited liability.” 190  Thompson does not appear to include evidentiary variations within this context,
nor does he explicitly address them in his study. Peter Oh's analysis is focused on fraud, 191  but breaking down fraud
claims between contract and tort actions ex ante without controlling for evidentiary differences may result in effectively
mixing contract and tort actions ex post. For example, in the veil-piercing context, many jurisdictions do not impose
heightened burdens of proof, even when backed by claims of fraud. 192
*1036  1. Preponderance of the Evidence, Heightened Standards of Proof, or Clear and Convincing Evidence
Depending on procedural context, especially whether or not a judge or jury serves as trier of fact, jurisdictions impose
preponderance, clear-and-convincing, and other intermediate forms of evidentiary burden. The link between this burden
and the social welfare shareholder/corporate separation is intended to promote is sometimes explicit. In Grayson v. R.B.
Ammon & Associations Inc., a Louisiana appellate court reasoned that, “because Louisiana considers the concept of the
corporation beneficial, the principle that the corporation is a separate entity should be disregarded only in exceptional
circumstances . . . [I]t is reasonable to conclude that [veil-piercing] should . . . be subjected to the same burden of proof,
i.e., clear and convincing evidence. 193
States that have adopted a preponderance of the evidence standard have not generally tied the decision to do so to
any explicit judicial policy. 194  Where they have provided some rationale, courts applying a preponderance standard
have stated that an action to pierce the corporate veil is no different than accompanying causes of action that also
require a preponderance finding. In one of the lengthier discussions of the issue, a Connecticut appellate court rejected
the suggestion that it adopt a clear-and-convincing standard, citing both federal law and practice in the states of
Nebraska, Nevada and Hawaii. 195  Yet the issue is clearly of concern where it is *1037  raised. In McCallum Family
L.L.C. v. Winger, a Colorado appellate court explicitly rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's dicta suggesting a clear-
and-convincing standard for veil-piercing claims based on an applicable Colorado statute which generally imposes a
preponderance burden for civil claims. 196
Other states impose an intermediate or heightened burden of proof to veil-piercing claims. Georgia courts do not
expressly state what standard of proof the plaintiff must meet, but case law suggests a heightened standard is applied
due to the court's practice of using caution when asked to disregard the corporate entity. 197  In Illinois, to pierce the
corporate veil, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a “substantial showing” . 198  New York courts impose a “heavy
burden” of showing each element of a veil-piercing claim. 199
2. Fraud
The distinction between these social choices plays out not only in veil-piercing claims generally, but specifically as to
contract, tort, or fraud actions, the latter of which may cut across the former. In 2005, a New Jersey trial court, for
example, likening actions to pierce the corporate veil in the contract context to equitable fraud actions, imposed a clear-
and-convincing standard of proof based on the history of equitable fraud actions in the chancery courts. 200  It *1038
specifically reserved the question of whether a similar burden of proof would apply in the tort context, although it
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suggested it would not. 201  In ServiceMaster v. J.R.L. Enterprises, for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court imposed a
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof on a veil-piercing claim based on fraudulent misrepresentation. 202  In the
same term, it approved a preponderance of the evidence standard--one that could be met with circumstantial evidence--
where the question rested squarely on whether the corporate form was used to perpetrate fraud. 203  In the former case,
the dispute arose from payments due under a franchising license. In the latter, consistent with a claim for fraudulent
conveyance, a sole shareholder transferred to himself all of a corporation's assets upon its dissolution, leaving a number
of creditors without even partial payment. 204  By altering the burden to that of a more stringent standard in the presence
of fraud allegations, Maine courts emphasize that such allegations allow plaintiffs in veil piercing cases to prevail only
if the evidence supporting them can be founded as highly probably versus merely more probable than not. 205
Many jurisdictions, however, retain the preponderance of the evidence standard, even for fraud. In Anthony v. Delagrange
Remodeling, Inc., 206  a Michigan appellate court explicitly rejected a clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for fraud
in the veil-piercing context, noting both that a preponderance standard was proper where, under Michigan law, “[f]raud
may be proved by facts that are inconsistent with an honest purpose” 207  and that “the corporate veil may be pierced even
in the absence of fraud.” 208  While the Texas legislature overruled the constructive fraud aspect of the Texas Supreme
Court's Castleberrydecision, it left the preponderance of the evidence and jury determination aspects of the decision in
place; the effect was to divide actual and constructive *1039  fraud claims according to their elements. 209
Conversely, Maryland effectively requires a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil to plead fraud to a heightened
standard “clear and specific acts” 210  and do so through “clear and convincing” proof that all elements of fraud exist. 211
Showing fraud by preponderance of the evidence is explicitly insufficient. 212  In Maryland, these standards apply to both
constructive and actual fraud, for if one type required a lesser degree of proof than the other, the form of fraud alleged
would be chosen based upon the burden of proof it carried with it. 213  Maryland contrasts with many other jurisdictions
which do not require a finding of fraud. 214
These variations limit the usefulness of studies that bundle together jurisdictions with differing rules of civil procedure
and evidence, which account for nearly all studies to date except Boyd's and Hoffman's. Oh notes that “general” versus
“specific” evidence of fraud or misrepresentation affect veil-piercing conclusions, but does not control for procedural
variables that would make that comparison difficult or impossible. 215  It may make more sense to sort fraud actions not
into contract (fraudulent misrepresentation) or tort (deceit) varieties but rather into the standards of proof parties must
meet in order to prevail on veil-piercing fraud claims.
D. Jury Access in Veil-Piercing Cases
Although all studies acknowledge that the circumstances surrounding settlement represent an important variable, none
assess the availability of a jury as a factor influencing 1) the willingness of  *1040  parties to settle or 2) the kinds of veil-
piercing claims (contract or tort) that reach a trial (and are therefore reported). 216  This is important in state jurisdictions
because it may mean that aggregate analyses capture a disproportionate number of veil-piercing cases from jurisdictions
in which there is no access to a jury. This would be similarly true for federal district courts which do not uniformly give
access to juries for veil-piercing claims. While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely addressed the issue
of veil-piercing claims for federal district courts located in Wisconsin, Illinois and Indiana (veil-piercing is procedural
under Erieand equitable under the Seventh Amendment), federal district courts for the most part have little guidance as
to whether the U.S. Constitution requires them to allow veil-piercing claimaints access to a jury under either Erieor the
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Seventh Amendment. Current studies make little or no effort to estimate where and why veil-piercing claims arise (or
are caught in database searches). California and New York courts donate the most veil-piercing cases to current studies,
which may be the result of their large populations and commercial activity. 217  But population and commercial activity
do not explain why Louisiana cases represent a large portion of the cases analyzed by both Thompson and Oh. 218  Access
to a jury may not only affect the likelihood that a given cases reaches trial, but it may also shape pleadings toward legal
forms of relief and away from injunctive and other equitable relief if the right to a jury is tied to the types of claims that
prevail in a given dispute.
1. Jury Right Jurisdictions
Several jurisdictions have established that veil-piercing claims are entitled to jury determination. 219  The reasons for this
right vary. The Supreme Court of Texas, for example, has tied the right to a jury *1041  trial on veil-piercing claims
to state constitutional provisions favoring jury determination of fact. 220  Others, like the District of Columbia, validate
the availability of a jury after practice undertaken in the lower courts. 221  Moreover, jurisdictions like Idaho, Florida,
and North Carolina refer explicitly or implicitly to the close relationship between the fact inquiries juries must make on
legal claims in contract or tort and the associated inquiries as to whether a controlling shareholder violated legal duties
as an individual or through a corporate entity. 222  In Mike v. Po Group, Inc., the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that
“[t]he conditions under which the corporate entity will be disregarded vary according to the circumstances present in
each case . . . . [A] determination of whether or not a corporation is a mere instrumentality of an individual or a parent
corporation is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury” . 223  Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a trial court's
directed verdict for a veil-piercing defendant, noting that “[t]he . . . evidence raised substantial issues of fact as to the
alleged defects that could only be determined by the jury as fact-finder.” 224  The Supreme Court of Oregon implied
that its veil-piercing jurisprudence had changed with respect to jury determinations, noting that “[m]any of our previous
opinions in this area of the law were written with no view that juries would be involved in the decisionmaking process
in such cases” yet establishing the specific charge juries should be given. 225  While the Georgia Supreme Court has not
spoken specifically to the  *1042  issue, the consensus in its appellate decisions is that juries should decide veil-piercing
claims. 226
2. Jurisdictions Rejecting Jury Rights for Veil-Piercing Claims
While jurisdictions authorizing a jury for veil-piercing claims emphasize fact-specificity and the close relationship
between veil-piercing and legal claims, jurisdictions which reject jury trial rights do so uniformly on the basis that veil-
piercing is an equitable action and therefore the province of the trial judge. 227  The Kentucky Supreme Court declared
unequivocally that “the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil arises in equity” and is therefore the province of the trial
court judge and not the jury. 228  The Wyoming Supreme Court was equally emphatic, concluding “that there exists no
right to a jury trial on the issue of piercing the corporate veil” because it is an equitable doctrine. 229  Veil-piercing claims
may only be heard by Delaware's chancery courts. 230  Nevada has imposed this rule statutorily, requiring that veil-
piercing decisions be made by the trial “court as a matter of law.” 231  California's Supreme Court has not spoken directly
to the availability of a jury to decide veil-piercing claims, but there is substantial consensus in the appellate decisions that
no such right exists, again because of its status as an “equitable remedy.” 232
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Nebraska's and Washington's Supreme Courts have declared that juries may consider veil-piercing claims along with
legal claims they must decide, but, given the equitable nature of veil-piercing claims, their pronouncements are merely
advisory. 233
*1043  3. Jurisdictions with Conditional Jury Rights
In many jurisdictions, the issue is unclear. 234  This is attributable to the assertion of a right to a jury trial which goes
uncontested; procedural rules which require litigation to proceed either as “legal” and subject to jury determination or
“equitable” and subject to judicial determination; simple confusion among the parties and trial judge; or, agreement
between the parties to have equitable issues tried by a jury. For example, actions to pierce the corporate veil in
Massachusetts may proceed as bench trials in their entirety, jury trials in their entirety, or as trials which are split between
jury issues and bench issues. 235  The judge has discretion to order a jury trial in such qualifying cases even if no party
has demanded it, and the judge also has discretion to remove equitable issues from the jury even when the claim as a
whole has been docketed for a jury trial. 236  A trial judge in a legal action to pierce the veil has “wide discretion” when
determining whether to reserve equitable issues for a bench trial. 237
Under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, a party who joins legal and equitable claims arising from the same
transaction waives the right to a jury trial on the legal claims. 238  With no guidance from the New York Court of Appeals,
trial courts have divided on whether a “claim” to pierce the corporate veil is equitable and therefore destroys the right
to a jury trial on the related legal claims. In Klein v. Loeb Holding Corp., a New York trial court determined that veil-
piercing actions seeking to enforce a judgment for money damages gave the claimant a right to a jury trial. 239  In First
Keystone Consultants, Inc. v. DDR Construction Services, a second trial court concluded that “[t]here is no right to a
trial by jury *1044  since piercing the corporate veil is an action that sounds in equity.” 240  Oklahoma maintains a
similar “paramount-incidental” test for equitable and legal claims whereby if equitable claims are paramount in a given
dispute, and legal claims only incidental, a claimant enjoys no right to a jury trial. 241  This is why, even though Oklahoma
law acknowledges veil-piercing as equitable, 242  a party may still obtain a jury determination for veil-piercing claims
with careful pleading. 243 Indeed, that is why a jury determination as to veil-piercing could survive a challenge in one of
Oklahoma's leading veil-piercing cases. 244  While Oklahoma courts may not grant a trial by right in actions where the
paramount issue is equitable in nature, the court may “impanel[] a jury to advise it on questions of fact” 245  although
the ultimate decision remains with the trial judge. 246
It is certainly true that in many jurisdictions, the law is simply not clear. It is possible to identify cases that, in the same
jurisdiction, allow and reject the right to trial by jury, and/or the state's highest court has not considered the issue. 247
In Advanced Telephone Systems, Inc. v. Com-Net Professional Mobile Radio, LLC, a Pennsylvania court surveyed the
inconsistency in Pennsylvania decisions on the issue, although it concluded in that case that veil-piercing claims did not
enjoy a right to a trial by jury. 248  The Court of Appeals of Iowa has held that the trial court “did not err [when it]
*1045  “instruct[ed] the jury on piercing the corporate veil.” 249  A Kansas appellate court has concluded that questions
regarding piercing the corporate veil should be submitted to a jury where “there was sufficient evidence contrary to the
findings on which reasonable minds might differ.” 250
E. Applicable Law
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An important but revealing aspect of some empirical studies to date is their preoccupation with the background
competition between states as potentially favorable jurisdictions for incorporators. Peter Oh highlighted a Nevada
corporate registration firm's advertisement that Nevada courts were less likely to pierce than California's (they back it
up with a $100,000 guarantee) based on Thompson's findings. 251  Boyd and Hoffman noted a study which found that
larger companies avoided incorporating in a jurisdiction identified by Thompson as having unfavorable veil-piercing
law. 252  These uses of Thompson's study embed the same assumption that Thompson made as well as Oh and others
that followed: that states apply the “internal affairs doctrine” in veil-piercing cases. 253  That is, a court will look to the
law of the state of incorporation to determine whether the veil should be pierced. The reality is different.
Robert Thompson and Peter Oh categorized court cases as though the internal affairs doctrine applied. 254  That is, if
an Illinois court applied Delaware veil-piercing law, that case was sorted as a *1046  “Delaware” case for purposes of
analysis. 255  Relatedly, it was assumed that the outcome of the case would be the same whether litigated in Illinois or
Delaware (or, for that matter, anywhere else). 256  McPherson and Raja reported data only for eight states and while the
phrasing of their discussion is not entirely clear, appear to also sort cases by the law of the state of incorporation. 257
Hodge and Sachs did not break down data by state law or forum, 258  and Matheson only distinguished between state
and federal courts and between trial and appellate courts. 259
To the extent they acknowledge the problem, all researchers concede that not all states apply the internal affairs doctrine.
Illinois courts reliably apply the law of the state of incorporation, 260  but Tennessee courts mandate application of
Tennessee veil-piercing law. 261  California and New York have asserted their ability to apply their own corporate law to
other states' corporations under certain circumstances. 262  In Massachusetts, veil-piercing claims that seek to reach out-
of-state corporations, courts should generally apply the substantive law of the state of incorporation to determine rights
and obligations related to “internal corporate affairs,” but turn to Massachusetts veil-piercing law to determine whether
to reach the corporations. 263  A New Jersey trial court applied New Jersey veil-piercing law to a dispute in which two
of three corporations were incorporated elsewhere. 264
Given the procedural variables outlined above, it is difficult to justify sorting cases by substantive state law rather than
the forum that hosts the dispute. Even if Delaware substantive law applies to a veil-piercing dispute in North Dakota,
it is inevitable that the ease *1047  with which veil-piercing actions are pled and the access claimants enjoy to a jury
would affect the outcome. Indeed, it is as likely that those variables explain liberal veil-piercing in North Dakota as
“undercapitalization” as a stand-alone basis of substantive liability. 265  The use of substantive state law to identify “easy”
versus “difficult” piercing law similarly says nothing about applicable evidentiary standards. Given that evidentiary
standards reflect specific social choices about allocating risk, the application of a “clear-and-convincing” standard by a
forum where the procedure of the state of incorporation would apply only preponderance legitimately calls into question
fundamental democratic principles and public policies. 266
III. PROCEDURAL VARIABLES AFFECTING VEIL-PIERCING ACTIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS
The majority of empirical studies of veil-piercing litigation to date have considered not only outcomes in state courts -
where the procedural variables discussed above have been largely ignored - but also in federal courts where the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) should theoretically bring uniformity over aspects of veil-piercing like pleading, form
of action, and the right to a jury trial. 267  Federal courts hear veil-piercing claims in two principal contexts: when they
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are brought in disputes where state law is applicable (diversity or supplemental jurisdiction) or under federal common
law. 268
Yet three aspects of federal jurisdiction exacerbate rather than ameliorate veil-piercing's procedural complexity. First,
within the FRCP, federal district courts do not agree on which pleading standards apply to veil-piercing claims. Second,
under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkinsand its progeny, federal district courts sitting
in diversity must apply both the FRCP and substantive state law. 269  Federal district courts must therefore make a
threshold decision as to whether veil-piercing is “substantive” or “procedural” for purposes of identifying applicable
*1048  law. Third, under the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution - which has never been incorporated against
the states - parties in federal court enjoy a right to a jury in civil trials where the amount in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars. 270  The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial attaches for
any claim that would have arisen under common law in 1791. 271  Federal courts have not agreed on whether, if veil-
piercing is in fact procedural rather than substantive, parties would have enjoyed a right to a jury trial on veil-piercing
claims in 1791. Each of these aspects of federal civil procedure, as well as the unclear content of federal veil-piercing law,
potentially affects existing veil-piercing studies in significant ways.
A. Pleading
Federal district courts are divided as to whether a claim for piercing the corporate veil must appear in written pleadings
before trial or in the pre-trial conference in order to be properly considered. In PEMEX Exploracion y Produccion v.
BASF Corp., a federal district judge concluded that “[veil-piercing] theories must be specifically pleaded or they are
waived, unless they are tried by consent.” 272  Other federal courts have rejected any standard greater than minimal notice
pleading for veil-piercing claims. 273
Boyd and Hoffman assert that pleading of a piercing claim before trial is the “majority rule” although it is not clear
whether that is a matter of federal or state procedure (they collect cases from both federal and state courts) nor even
how those cases represent one rule or another. 274  They cite Sudamax Industria e Comercia de Cigarros *1049  Ltda.
v. Buttes & Ashes, Inc. for the proposition that veil-piercing must be pled 275  even though that court considered the
merits of veil-piercing allegation. 276  They cite the Third Circuit's decision in Scully v. U.S. Wats, Inc. for the proposition
that veil-piercing is waived when not pled, 277  but that decision made no mention of waiver as a sanction for failure to
plead. 278  Similarly, Boyd and Hoffman cite Luyster v. Textronas supporting the majority rule 279  even though that court
did not require the plaintiff to plead a veil-piercing theory, only facts that supported the New York state veil-piercing
standard. 280  Conversely, they cite Gill v. Byers Chevrolet LLC as representative of the minority rule 281  even though
that court appeared to require the plaintiff to meet the same pleading standard as in Luyster. 282  The point is that, even
if Boyd and Hoffman are correct that specific pleading of veil-piercing is the majority rule, the minority is a significant
one. The upshot is, as they correctly note, “there may be two kinds of cases generally missing from our dataset: failed
attempts to add veil piercing claims in waiver jurisdictions and successful attempts in lenient jurisdictions.” 283
B. Erie
In 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled 284  its long-standing precedent, Swift v. Tyson, which held that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction should apply state substantive law to state claims, but narrowly construed the scope of
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applicable state law while simultaneously implying broad common law making powers by federal courts. 285  In Erie,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided conclusively that federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction enjoyed no general
common law-making powers, and admonished lower federal courts to apply not only state statutory law, as Swift v.
Tyson suggested, but also state common law developed by state appellate courts. 286  Eriewas decided the same year that
the Federal *1050  Rules of Civil Procedure displaced the Federal Equity Rules and the Conformity Act, 287  resulting
in a system under which federal courts applied the FRCP, which were less deferential to state civil procedure, to disputes
brought under diversity jurisdiction, which newly required federal courts to take a broader view of applicable state law.
This procedure/substance divide continues to shape litigation in federal courts, as their experience with state veil-piercing
law amply demonstrates. 288
To some extent the pleading discussion above is one aspect of the way state law functions in federal courts. Whether
or not a veil-piercing claim is waived if not specifically pled is arguably a function of the law of waiver under either
state substantive law or FRCP 8. 289  In Allen v. United Properties & Construction., Inc., a Colorado federal district court
applied a Tenth Circuit case applying Colorado veil-piercing law, but concluded that “[Allen]'s allegations against Denver
Lending satisfy either Rule 8 or the Supreme Court's test in Bell Atlantic Corp.” 290  Federal district courts addressing
the issue imply rather than explicitly address whether they are deciding as a matter of the state law of waiver or federal
pleading rules. 291  In Gill v. Byers Chevrolet L.L.C., for example, the federal district court applied pre- Iqbal liberal
pleading standards to a veil-piercing claim brought under Ohio law. 292  The court concluded that:
in order to successfully pierce the corporate veil, the plaintiff must prove all of the [Ohio law] factors.
However, the courts are not entirely uniform regarding whether a plaintiff must specifically allege in the
amended complaint that defendant meets all of the . . . criteria in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 293
The court then reviewed both state and federal court cases *1051  relevant to veil-piercing pleading. 294  Although there
is neither clarity nor explication, it may very well be that federal courts are generally concluding that there is no conflict
between state and federal pleading requirements and thus no Erieproblem.
However, there is sufficient reason to doubt that federal courts may reach that conclusion as uniformly as they appear
to, or at least, as uniformly as Boyd and Hoffman suggest they do. In the discussion over pleading standards above, it is
clear that state jurisdictions vary from liberal notice pleading to heightened pleading standards and even, for jurisdictions
that require fraud, pleading with particularity. Does FRCP 9(b) requiring that fraud be pled with particularity apply
to a veil-piercing claim where fraud is alleged as the “improper purpose” prong of the typical three-part test? 295  Given
that one purpose of Erie was to preserve uniformity in the application of state law, federal district courts should at least
analyze state law in considering motions brought under FRCP 12. If they are, the result, like studies of state jurisdictions,
may result in a disproportionate number of cases (and, therefore “litigation events”) from notice pleading jurisdictions.
That affects not only studies undertaken by Thompson, Matheson, Oh and others, but also Boyd's and Hoffman's. 296
Given that each federal district court case produces multiple “litigation events,” that selection bias may result in more
heavily distorted results than studies that focus on outcomes only.
C. The Seventh Amendment and the Right to a Jury on Veil-Piercing Claims
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The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that the right to a trial by jury “In Suits at common law . . .
shall be preserved.” 297  Because of the wording of the amendment, analysis of whether a party enjoys a right to a trial
by jury in civil cases generally proceeds from a historical inquiry as to whether that party would have enjoyed a right to
a jury trial in 1791. 298  Federal district courts sitting in diversity must therefore decide whether parties seeking to pierce
the corporate veil 1) obtain the right to a trial by *1052  jury as a function of Erieor of the Seventh Amendment and 2)
if the Seventh Amendment, is an action for veil-piercing within the common law suits available in 1791.
Federal courts are divided on these questions. 299  In International Financial Services Corp. v. Chromas Technologies
Canada Inc., the Seventh Circuit concluded somewhat confusingly that when “a district court is applying the substantive
law of a state, federal procedural law controls the question of whether there is a right to a jury trial,” 300  but hinged
its conclusion - that veil-piercing is equitable and therefore ineligible for a jury trial - on whether veil-piercing was an
equitable remedy under Illinois law. 301  Because Illinois trial courts pierce the corporate veil as a matter of discretion
to avoid “injustice or inequity”, the claim, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, was equitable. 302  The court asserted that
“[p]iercing the corporate veil, after all, is not itself an action; it is merely a procedural means of allowing liability on a
substantive claim, here breach of contract.” 303
The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's holding in FMC Financial Corporation v. Murphree, (applying
Illinois law) that the right to trial by jury was strictly an issue of federal procedural law and that U.S. Supreme Court and
Fifth Circuit precedent favored jury resolution of veil-piercing claims. 304  The FMC court emphasized the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Co-op, Inc. which ordered an issue of South Carolina statutory law to be
decided by a jury in diversity proceedings in a federal district court, even though the Supreme Court of South Carolina
had decided the issue should be decided as a matter of law by the state trial court. 305  In Wm. Passalacqua Builders,
Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on not only its prior precedent and
FMC, but also a historical *1053  survey of veil-piercing in the English courts of law and equity. 306  Under the Second
Circuit's historical analysis, veil-piercing was most analogous to actions to enforce a creditor's bill comprised of actions
in both the courts of equity and law. While the Second Circuit was not explicit, it appeared to reach its conclusion as
though federal procedural law flowing from the Seventh Amendment controlled. However, it made an additional finding
not specifically tied to federal or state law:
Moreover, as a practical matter separate from Seventh Amendment considerations, whether or not those
factors--discussed later in our analysis-- that will justify ignoring the corporate form and imposing liability
on affiliated corporations or shareholders are present in a given case is the sort of determination usually
made by a jury because it is so fact specific. 307
These decisions have splintered the lower federal courts outside the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits. 308  As with
pleading and evidentiary variables outlined above, current studies make no effort to control for whether the existence
of a jury right may 1) skew the sample of cases or dockets or 2) correlate (and by extension potentially explain) certain
phenomena. Boyd's and Hoffman's predictions as to judicial behavior, for example, make more sense in cases where the
district court 1) found veil-piercing to be equitable and therefore within his or her discretion or 2) exercised his or her
control over a jury verdict by ordering a new trial or entering a judgment as a matter of law.
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*1054  IV. THE INFLUENCE OF PROCEDURE
The rules of civil procedure and evidence inevitably influence the choice as to whether to pursue a veil-piercing claim
versus an alternative; the incentives to settle all or part of a lawsuit; and, whether or not a veil-piercing claim proceeds
past a preliminary point in litigation. Yet empirical studies to date either speculate as to or explain certain veil-piercing
phenomena as a result of substantive state veil-piercing law and its constituent inquiries, especially those related to
control and “improper purpose.” Many of those studies also combine cases decided before and after 1938- when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and then replicated by states - even though those cases would have been
adjudicated under drastically different regimes. 309
A. Alternative Theories of Recovery
Scholars have always known that veil-piercing claims are litigation alternatives to other strategies which achieve the
same result: unification of shareholders and their corporations for a variety of legal purposes. In jurisdictions with liberal
pleading rules, preponderance evidentiary standards and access to a jury, there may be little reason to do more in the
initial complaint or petition than name both shareholders and their corporations, include general allegations relevant to
a state's veil-piercing elements, and perhaps not even identify the theory by name. This would advance interests in wide
discovery requests as well as flexibility for crystallizing issues for trial.
Where jurisdictions start to peel away those procedural advantages, different strategies and causes of action will control
the course of litigation. Plaintiffs may pursue other legal theories to hold a corporation's owners liable, and sometimes
plead more than one such theory in the same complaint when facts exist to support another theory. Other legal
theories which sometimes overlap with veil piercing actions include agency liability, 310  direct personal liability for
wrongs committed by corporate owners like fraudulent transfer, 311  and joint venture or enterprise liability between the
corporation and its corporate or individual shareholders. 312  The *1055  Supreme Court of Oregon, in the same case
it required veil-piercing to be specifically pled, noted alternative theories by which corporate creditors might recover
from shareholders:
[T]raditional agency and respondeat superior principles[,] . . . a fraud form of action[,] . . . statutory
remedies, . . . estoppel, quasi contract, creditors' bill, and, finally, the theory that the shareholder, by the
shareholder's own conduct, has acted so as to create direct liability as an actor by virtue of the shareholder's
own participation in the conduct which gave rise to the creditor's cause of action. 313
In jurisdictions which take a view that veil-piercing is an equitable remedy, claimants may be forced to exhaust other
theories before allowing a veil-piercing claim to proceed. 314  Moreover, in cases where more than one theory is submitted
to a jury, an appellate court may affirm if there is sufficient evidence to affirm any theory of recovery. 315  In their study
of veil-piercing cases in Texas, Hamilton, Miller, and Ragazzo found that many cases in which veil-piercing had been
invoked were actually pedestrian agency cases. 316  In Garrett v. Albright, for example, a federal district court initially
granted summary judgment to a corporate parent under a veil-piercing theory controlled by an Eighth Circuit precedent
interpreting federal veil-piercing law, but then later made that parent's assets available to the plaintiffs under a Missouri
state statute that made the parent responsible for the subsidiary's actions. 317
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These alternative theories and their use necessarily affect depictions of the “ease” of state veil-piercing laws and the
inquiries embedded within those laws even within the cases caught by most database searches. For example, both
Thompson and Oh note that Delaware produces few veil-piercing cases given the number of close *1056  corporations
that choose it as governing law. 318  But that is just as easily explained by the special jurisdiction of Delaware Courts
of Chancery which would almost always hear veil-piercing claims, even if the related litigation occurred in its courts of
law. 319  The incentive for at least some litigants would be to find alternative theories under which to merge shareholders
and corporations. 320  Outside Delaware's courts, there is no obvious reason to believe that procedural variables will not
affect outcomes even when courts apply the same veil-piercing test. Lower federal courts, for example, disagree as to
whether Delaware requires a preponderance or heightened burden of proof. 321
B. Procedural Explanations for Veil-Piercing Phenomena
Current veil-piercing studies overwhelmingly explain phenomena in terms of substantive state veil-piercing law.
Thompson writes, for example, that “[k] nowledge of the differences between state approaches will probably be of
greater use to prospective plaintiffs, who, given a choice, would rather file in a state whose results are more inclined to
piercing.” 322  Peter Oh notes that “Ohio's 55.87% veil-piercing rate is considerably simpler to explain, as courts apply
a fairly liberal standard that does not require proof of actual or constructive fraud.” 323  He similarly argues that, when
applying New York law, the difference between federal courts' relatively high veil-piercing rates and New York state
courts' relatively low veil-piercing rate is explained by the difference in the tests they use. 324  *1057  Introducing the
background to his study, John Matheson predicts that “one would expect that any common law doctrine should be
applied by the courts in a neutral manner, that is, evenhandedly except for variations in factors explicitly and specifically
identified as part of the applicable test.” 325
But each of these explanations, taken as representative of empirical studies as a whole, is equally explicable by reference
to applicable rules of civil procedure. Parties seeking to pierce the corporate veil, especially those represented by shrewd
attorneys, are more likely to look for jurisdictions which allow the right mix of notice pleading of veil-piercing claims,
flexibility to bring those claims toward the beginning of litigation, application (or not) of the internal affairs doctrine in
veil-piercing cases, preponderance of the evidence standard, and access to a jury. These factors may have nothing at all
to do with which variation of the Powell or Fletcher test states have adopted. Correspondingly, Ohio's relatively high
veil-piercing rate may have more to do with its notice pleading standards, preponderance standard, 326  and access to
a jury. 327  This is all the more likely given that substantive Ohio veil-piercing law has been particularly volatile over
the period studied by Thompson, Oh, and others. 328  Federal and state courts applying New York law may be using
different tests - although it is not clear that this is so - but substantive law aside, in New York state courts, veil-piercing
is not generally available at the beginning of litigation; it is held to a heightened pleading standard, a heightened proof
standard, and the right of a claimant to a jury is both uncertain and fragile depending on the other claims to which it
is tied. There is therefore nothing about Matheson's study that necessarily implicates the hypothesis he advances. Two
judges applying the same common law test in two different jurisdictions may arrive at different conclusions not because
of differences in competence, integrity, or “neutrality,” but simply *1058  because the rules of procedure and evidence
under which they adjudicate lead to those conclusions.
There is a sufficiently large literature doubting the possibility of neutrally applied rules that there is no need to veer
into that discussion here. 329  It is enough to say that purely from an empirical perspective, the procedural variables
outlined above may independently explain phenomena that researchers tie to substantive state law and constituent
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inquiries related to control and improper corporate purpose. Boyd and Hoffman are the least guilty of this neglect. By
studying only the dockets of federal district courts, they necessarily embed fewer procedural differences than studies
which aggregate both state and federal cases. They even go further by examining corporate size and the personal profile
of judges. In this respect, theirs is the most skeptical study as to the effect of substantive state or federal common law
of veil-piercing. They write: “In summary, legal realism tempers the ambition of empirically based studies of litigation.
It discounts the likelihood that the formal rules of law are doing their perceived work in molding the resolution of
disputes.” 330
But Boyd's and Hoffman's study is not only limited by its scope - it can only tell us about what happens in federal courts
where a minority of veil-piercing litigation occurs - but also by procedural variables. They concede that they do not
control for the differing pleading standards adopted by federal district courts which may affect their sample size and
therefore their outcomes. More significantly, they do not control for the availability of jury trials in the dockets they
study which may not only affect the overall course of the litigation, but may also be relevant to whether a judge, rather
than a jury, “pierces” for purposes of their analysis of judicial behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has made two central arguments. The first is that current empirical studies of veil-piercing cases fail to
control for procedural and evidentiary variables, and analysts need to do a better job of comparing apples to apples in
veil-piercing cases. Cases in which veil-piercing is brought toward the beginning of litigation, subjected to liberal pleading
standards, held to a lower or higher evidentiary burden, or submitted to a jury for determination will necessarily affect
case outcomes. By bundling together cases across jurisdictions and court levels (trial, appellate, supreme), current *1059
studies strip away too much relevant information about what actually happens in veil-piercing litigation.
Second, I have argued that rules of civil procedure and evidence may independently explain phenomena that current
studies tie to substantive federal and state law tests. While Stephen Presser and Peter Oh associate North Dakota's high
veil-piercing rate with its attitude toward “undercapitalization” as a legal basis to pierce, it may be just as likely that its
liberal pleading standards, lower burden of proof, and access to a jury on veil-piercing claims matter more. Researchers
should be sensitive to other procedural influences, like statutes of limitations and res judicata, which may shape how and
why veil-piercing is chosen over alternative theories that unify shareholders and corporations.
The main implication is that empirically-oriented veil-piercing analysts should take more care to define their principal
behavior of interest and to ensure that measures of that behavior adequately adhere to the context in which that behavior
occurs. Most scholars are generally not focused on veil-piercing because they are interested in Powell's three-part test;
they are interested in veil-piercing as a measure of the extent to which state and federal judges respect the separation
between shareholders and their corporations. Collecting cases and sorting them or their internal criteria as an index of
judicial behavior is not sufficient. Including procedural variables is relevant for the same reasons the rules are always
important: they necessarily entail distributive effects. The trend toward more stringent application of veil-piercing,
which many scholars acknowledge, may be as much firms playing for the rules as legislators or judges adopting a more
sympathetic posture toward limited liability entities.
This Article has not, of course, demonstrated as an empirical matter that the associations drawn by existing empirical
studies of veil-piercing might not resurface if researchers controlled for procedural and evidentiary differences. Instead
of such a demonstration, which involves a larger research project than may be offered here, there are two research
trajectories worth considering. First, within any given jurisdiction, researchers may test the various theories by which
shareholders and corporations are unified for purposes of legal liabilities--including agency, joint venture, enterprise
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liability, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting--as a better measure of whether judges in a particular state respect
shareholder-corporate separation. Second, scholars may eschew the use of admittedly subjective case sorting methods
or multivariate regression analyses for the less exciting but arguably more fitting approach of case studies and surveys of
how and why veil-piercing law and procedurehave adapted as they have in response to changes in both state corporation
codes and state rules of civil procedure.
*1060  Peter Oh has already made one step in this direction; tracing the history of veil-piercing, arguing as a historical
matter that it was an equitable remedy, and urging a return to its roots. 331  He may be correct as a historical and
normative matter. But it is worth considering that as the fundamental bargain for limited liability between society and
entrepreneurs has democratized and corporations rapidly assume the character and legal form as all other citizens, it is
entirely reasonable that procedure and law adapt to fit that reality.
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and assumes that the corporation itself is liable for the obligation sought to be imposed ... Thus, an attempt of a third party
to pierce the corporate veil does not constitute a cause of action independent of that against the corporation; rather it is an
assertion of facts and circumstances which will persuade the court to impose the corporate obligation on its owners.”' (citation
omitted)).
103 Hennessey's Tavern, Inc. v. Am. Air Filter Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 859, 865 (Ct. App. 1988).
104 See Dixon v. Process Corp., 382 A.2d 893, 900 (Md. 1978) (“[T] here was no fraud and ... no paramount equity was present
in the case sub judice which required the intervention of equity's awesome powers.”) (emphasis added).
105 See Lampkin v. Thrash, 81 So. 3d 1193, 1199 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Wolf v. Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Neb. 1995) (“Wolf
alleged four causes of action: conversion, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and bailment. Wolf further alleged that Walt
operated Flat Top as a façade for his personal business enterprises and asked the court for an order disregarding Flat Top's
corporate identity.”).
106 Five Points Hotel P'ship v. Pinsonneault, 835 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (D. Ariz. 2011).
107 Id. (citing Chalpin v. Snyder, 207 P.3d 666, 670 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (“The trial court, however, allowed Reliance to take
its claims of fraud and alter-ego to a jury. Ultimately, Reliance did not request a jury instruction for its alter-ego claim.”)
(emphasis added by the court)); GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 795 P.2d 827, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (“In the
case before us, the complaint contained four counts ... Count I alleged that [] was responsible for the debt owed by [] and []
pursuant to an alter ego theory of liability ....”). Contra Sandpiper Resorts Dev. Corp. v. Global Realty Invs., LLC, No. 2:08-
CV-01360JWS, 2012 WL 3234242, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2012) (“Piercing the corporate veil is not a stand alone legal claim.”).
108 Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge,211 P.3d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 2009), overruled by Weinstein v. Colborne Foodbotics, LLC,
302 P.3d 263 (Colo. 2013). ContraSwinerton Builders v. Nassi, 272 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Colo. App. 2012) (concluding that veil-
piercing is not a separate and independent cause of action and that “[a] claimant seeking to pierce the corporate veil must
make a clear and convincing showing that each of the foregoing factors has been satisfied.”).
109 563 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see Mark C. Larson, Piercing the Veil of Pennsylvania Limited Liability Companies,
75 PA. B. ASSN. Q.124, 126 (2004).
110 .KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7101(b) (2009).
111 See Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v. Poynter, 473 P.2d 33, 40 (Kan. 1970).
112 Lane v. Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 68 P.3d 819, 824 (Mont. 2003) (collecting cases in which veil piercing claims are
not precluded because they are based on satisfaction of a judgment).
113 For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires that parties be joined who are necessary for the disposition of the
dispute or whose interests may be jeopardized if they do not participate. FED. R. CIV. P. 19. Many states have their own
versions of Rule 19 which in many cases will encourage parties to bring both corporations and their shareholders into the
dispute, implicating a veil-piercing determination.
114 See Strange v. Estate of Lindemann, 408 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App. 2013).
115 SeePhillips v. United Heritage Corp., 319 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Tex. App. 2010).
116 Robert W. Hamilton et. al., 20 Tex. Prac., Business Organizations § 26.12 (2d ed.).
117 SeeSonne v. Sacks, 314 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1973).
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118 See e.g., Discovery Techs., Inc. v. AvidCare Corp., 2005 WL 350438, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (upholding lower
court's dismissal of complaint on the veil piercing claim stating despite adoption of notice pleading, complaint failed to allege
sufficient factual basis to give individual defendant notice that he would be held personally liable).
119 Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 219 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) Petty v. Bank of N.M. Holding Co., 787 P.2d 443, 445 (N.M.
1990) (“Under our rules of ‘notice pleading,’ it is sufficient that defendants be given only a fair idea of the nature of the claim
asserted against them sufficient to apprise them of the general basis of the claim.”); See also Strong v. Hegarty, 1996 Mass.
App. Div. 92 (Dist. Ct. 1996) (“A complaint seeking to pierce the corporate veil must allege “facts sufficient to support” that
theory, but need not explicitly identify veil piercing as a theory for recovery.”).
120 Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985).
121 A.B.C. Home & Real Estate Inspection, Inc. v. Plummer, 500 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (citing IND. R. TRIAL
P. 15(B)).
122 Geier v. Nat'l GG Indus., Inc., No. 98-L-172, 1999 WL 1313640, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999) (“In both assignments,
Wagner argues that because Geier did not specifically set forth the “piercing the corporate veil” theory of liability in his
complaint, the court should not have permitted the theory of liability to be presented to the jury. Secondly, he argues the
issue was not tried by the implied consent of the parties. Lastly, he claims that as a result of lack of notice that piercing the
corporate veil would be an issue at trial, his defense was unfairly prejudiced. Wagner's objections are essentially procedural
in nature.” Id. at *3.).
123 Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, supra note 12, at 1063.
124 Id.
125 . JAMES J. HANKS, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW § 4.18 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL “A
HERCULEAN TASK” (Supp. 2013).
126 SeeResidential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 728 A.2d 783, 789 (Md. App. 1999) (although
the Court of Appeals has opined that a corporation may be pierced to enforce a paramount equity, no Maryland appellate
court has permitted this to occur).
127 Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966). Contra Goldberg v. Lee Exp. Cab Corp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 642 N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Div. 1996) (“[P]laintiffs have set forth ‘a cognizable action for piercing the
corporate veil[s] and assigning personal liability’ to defendant More in this action.”).
128 SeeAmfac Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 654 P.2d 1092, 1098 (Or. 1982).
129 2005 WL 503721, at *1 (Mass. Jan. 14, 2005).
130 Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at n. 121.
131 Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 2010 §1:1.
132 SeePeter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 434 (2012) (“[L]ightning, ... is rare, severe,
and unprincipled.”); Matheson, supranote 71, at 1100; Oh, supra note 14, at 85; P.R. Strauss, Control and/or Misconduct:
Clarifying the Test for Piercing the Corporate Veil in Alaska, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 65, 65 n.4 (1992); Glenn G. Morris, Piercing
the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 271, 272 n.3 (1991).
133 Presser , supranote 131, §1.1.
134 Oh, supra note 14, at 84.
135 Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 13 n.41 (1978).
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136 Id. at 13.
137 .CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS609 (6th ed. 2010).
138 SeeOh, supra note 14, at 84.
139 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.§ 78.747 (2014) (“2. A stockholder, director or officer acts as the alter ego of a corporation if:
(a)The corporation is influenced and governed by the stockholder, director or officer;
(b)There is such unity of interest and ownership that the corporation and the stockholder, director or officer are inseparable
from each other; and
(c)Adherence to the corporate fiction of a separate entity would sanction fraud or promote a manifest injustice.
3.The question of whether a stockholder, director or officer acts as the alter ego of a corporation must be determined by the
court as a matter of law.”).
142 .FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 56
n.9 (1991).
143 STUART FINESTONE, GEORGIA POST-JUDGMENT COLLECTION § 13:4 (5th ed. 2013).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 SeePepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. v.Checkers, Inc., 754 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1985); George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Gateman,
16 F. Supp. 2d 129, 158 (D. Mass. 1998) (asserting heightened proof to reach individual shareholders); Evans v. Multicon
Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing piercing against individuals); My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Mass. 1968) (discussing piercing in corporate groups).
147 SeeCont'l Supply Co. v. Forrest E. Gilmore Co., 55 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
148 SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. Co., 275 S.W.3d 444, 450-51 (Tex. 2009).
149 Id.at 451-56.
150 Richards v. Transocean, Inc., 333 S.W.3d 326, 331 (Tex. App. 2010).
151 Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 235 Cal. App.3d 1220, 1249-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
152 Brown v. ANA Ins. Grp., 965 So.2d 902, 926 (La. Ct. App. 2007). The “single business enterprise” doctrine is a theory for
imposing liability where two or more business entities act as one. Generally, under the doctrine, when corporations integrate
their resources in operations to achieve a common business purpose, each business may be held liable for wrongful acts done
in pursuit of that purpose. See Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 646 (2005);
Brown v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 644 So.2d 723, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Green v. Champion Ins. Co, 577 So.2d 249, 259 (La.
Ct. App. 1991).
153 SeeLaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653, 654 (Me. 1991) (limiting worker's relief to workers' compensation instead of veil-piercing
claim); Maine Aviation Corp. v. Johnson, 196 A.2d 748, 750 (Me. 1964) (unifying corporations and shareholders for purposes
of site location law).
154 Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. v. Johnson, 173 A.2d 141, 145 (Me. 1961).
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155 See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (4th ed. 2010).
156 Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
157 SeeEvans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 398, 400 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“Particularly in the area of construction,
there is a statutory scheme which permits subcontractors to obtain a lien for labor or material furnished against the improved
real estate.... Evans chose not to avail himself of that remedy. A litigant may also obtain an attachment against assets of a
defendant whose assets, as was the case with [Multicon Construction Corporation], might not be susceptible to an execution.”).
158 Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 13, at 860 (citing Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1916-23 (1991)).
159 Hodge & Sachs, supranote 12, at 353-54.
160 SeeOh, Supranote 14, at 127.
161 Id.at 89.
162 Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prod. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Ohio law).
163 Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 279-80 (Tex. 1986) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
164 .ELIZABETH S. MILLER & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, TEXAS METHODS OF PRACTICE § 46:2 (2014) (“Piercing
should be permitted in contract cases only where the plaintiff can demonstrate significant abuse of the bargaining process or
the manner in which the corporation's business is thereafter conducted, for example through fraud, deception, or operation
of the corporation in unexpected ways that improperly divert corporate assets to shareholders while bypassing corporate
liabilities.”) (citing ROBERT HAMILTON, 19 TEXAS PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 234 (2003)).
165 Id.
166 Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d 270.
167 Id. at 271-77; see also ROBERT W. HAMILTON AND JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 347 (8th ed. 2003). The
Texas law of piercing the corporate veil took a bizarre turn in Castleberry v. Branscum -a case decided by a five to four vote. The
court rewrote the traditional piercing rhetoric so broadly that it appeared likely that thereafter shareholders' protection from
liability on both contract and tort obligations had become entirely dependent on a jury's determination that the transaction
met some undefined and abstract standard of fairness.
168 See Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272 & n.3 (citing Torregrossa v. Szele, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804-05 (Tex. 1980); Tigrett v. Pointer,
580 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App. 1979)).
169 .ELIZABETH S. MILLER & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, 13 TEX. PRAC., TEXAS METHODS OF PRACTICE § 46:2
(quoting Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 271).
170 Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 273.
171 See id. at 273. See generally Brent Lee, Veil Piercing and Actual Fraud Under Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation
Act, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 429 (2002).
172 Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.21 (expired Jan. 1, 2011).
173 Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 21.223 (West 2007).
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174 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 100 (W. Va. 1986); see also Hill v. Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, 134
So.3d 396, 412 (Ala. 2013) (Murdock, J. concurring).
175 See Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1304 (Me. 1996).
176 Boatman v. Jordan, 243 N.E.2d 644, 647  (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).
177 Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985); Fiumetto v. Garrett, 749 N.E.2d 992, 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
178 Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc. v. Ratliff, 954 So.2d 427, 431-32 (Miss. 2007); Hogan v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 320 S.E.2d
555, 558 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
179 See supra text accompanying note 2.
180 See Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund v. World Transp., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 499, 504 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (recognizing the
importance of undercapitalization in veil-piercing analysis).
181 352 S.E.2d 93, 101 (W. Va. 1986) (citation omitted).
182 Collet v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 273, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
183 Id.; see also S. Lumber & Coal Co. v. M.P. Olson Real Estate & Constr. Co., 426 N.W.2d 504, 510 (Neb. 1988) (holding that
the corporation was not undercapitalized because plaintiff and defendant's expert agreed that corporate capitalization “was
consistent with the usual course of business in the housing construction industry at the time”); J. L. Brock Builders, Inc. v.
Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Neb. 1986) (finding that although experts agree that the corporation was undercapitalized,
undercapitalization in the home construction business was not unusual and that home construction businesses could meet the
“industry standard” capitalization).
184 419 N.W.2d 211, 222 (Wis. 1988).
185 Id.
186 See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981) (stating that standard of proof is traditionally left to judiciary to resolve).
187 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] standard of proof represents an attempt to
instruct the fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”).
188 Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 165 A.2d 531, 533-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
189 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
190 Thompson, supra note 12, at 1039.
191 Oh, supra note 12, at 90.
192 See infraSection II.C.I.
193 Grayson v. R. B. Ammon and Assocs., Inc., 778 So.2d 1, 14 (La. Ct. App. 2000); see also C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight L.P.,
580 S.E.2d 806, 811 (Va. 2003) (applying a clear and convincing standard in the reverse veil piercing context but equating the
standard for reverse piercing with other veil-piercing actions for purposes of evidentiary burdens): Harlow v. Fibron Corp.,
671 P.2d 40, 45-46 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that fraud was not established by clear and convincing evidence).
194 See Fazio v. Brotman, 371 N.W.2d 842, 846 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Alternative Nursing Care, Inc. v. C.H. Wright, Inc., No.
CV-01-168, 2003 WL 21911056, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct., Jun. 2, 2003).
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195 Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 310-311 (2002), overruled on other grounds byRobinson v.
Coughlin, 830 A.2d 1114 (2003) (citing J.L. Brock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110 (Neb.1986) (relaxed standard
for fraud); Wyatt v. Bowers, 747 P.2d 881 (Nev.1970) (applying the preponderance of evidence standard of proof to veil
piercing)); see also Mid-South Mgmt. Co. Inc. v. Sherwood Dev. Corp., 649 S.E.2d 135, 140 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (applying
preponderance of the evidence standard to veil piercing claim); Byars v. v. Herman, No. 83496, 2004 WL 1532224, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“To pierce the corporate veil and impose personal liability on a shareholder, the burden is on the party
seeking to pierce the corporate veil to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence ...”); Crutchfield v. Russ-Mar, Inc., No.
CA 98-901, 1999 WIL 151646, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (implicitly upholding preponderance standard); Priskie v. Missry,
958 So.2d 613, 613 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (“Generally, the rule is that the corporate veil will not be pierced absent a showing
of improper conduct .... ‘Three factors must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the shareholder dominated
and controlled the corporation to such an extent that the corporation's independent existence, was in fact non-existent and
the shareholders were in fact alter egos of the corporation (2) the corporate form must have been used fraudulently or for
an improper purpose and (3) the fraudulent or improper use of the corporate form caused injury to the claimant.”’ (quoting
Seminole Boatyard, Inc. v. Christoph, 715 So.2d 987, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)); Escobedo v. BHM Health Associates,
Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2004) (A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil “may only recover from a shareholder if the
party proves by a preponderance of the evidence ‘that the corporate form was so ignored, controlled or manipulated that it
was merely the instrumentality of another and that the misuse of the corporate form would constitute a fraud or promote
injustice.”’ (quoting Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994)); Ize Nantan Bagowa, Ltd. v. Scalia, 577 P.2d 725, 729
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (“[I]t is incumbent upon one seeking to pierce the corporate veil to show by preponderance of evidence
that financial setup of corporation is only a sham and causes an injustice.”).
196 McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 74 (Colo. App. 2009) (rejecting the clear and convincing standard imposed
by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006) as outside the scope of the question certified
to the Colorado Supreme Court).
197 See, e.g., Soerries v. Dancause, 546 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
198 Kelsey Axle & Break Div . v. Presco Plastics, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989).
199 Joseph Kali Corp. v. A. Goldner, Inc., 859 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (2008).
200 D.R. Horton Inc. - N.J. v. Dynastar Dev., L.L.C., No. MER-L-1808-00, 2005 WL 1939778, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 10,
2005) (“Applying these considerations, the court concludes that a fact-finder should have a higher degree of confidence in a
claim to pierce the veil on a private contract claim. The same considerations that call for a heightened level of proof in an
equitable or legal fraud claim are at play in a corporate veil piercing claim.”); Notes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 111, 112 (1946).
201 D.R. Horton Inc., 2005 WL 1939778, at *23.
202 ServiceMaster Indus. v. J.R.L. Enterprises, 388 N.W.2d 39, 43 (Neb. 1986).
203 SeeBrock Builders, Inc. v. Dahlbeck, 391 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Neb. 1986) ; see alsoWolf v. Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 891 (Neb.
1995).
204 The court wrote “Among the factors relevant in determining whether to disregard the corporate entity are ...” and then
proceeded to list the factors without including the caveat “on the basis of fraud.” Global Credit Servs., Inc. v. AMISUB (Saint
Joseph Hosp.) Inc., 508 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Neb. 1993).
205 Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health & Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 153 (Me. 1984).
206 Anthony v. Delarange Remodeling, Inc., No. 252644, 2005 WL 602561 (Mich. Ct. App. March 15, 2005).
207 Id. at *7 (citing Foodland Distribs. V. Al-Naimi, 559 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Mich. 1996))
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208 Id. at *7 (citing Foodland Distribs., 559 N.W.2d at 382).
209 Brent Lee, Veil Piercing and Actual Fraud Under Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act, 54 BAYLOR L. REV.
427, 429 (2002) (citing Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986)) (finding that the following causes of action
incorporate actual fraud: (1) material misrepresentations; (2) fraudulent inducement; (3) tortious interference with contractual
relations; (4) conspiracy; (5) statutory claims).
210 .JAMES J. HANKS, JR., § 4.18 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL “A HERCULEAN TASK”; MARYLAND
CORPORATION LAW 122.14 (2013).
211 Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 728 A.2d 783, 790 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999);
Colandrea v. Colandrea, 401 A.2d 480, 484 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); see also, Starfish Condo Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv.
Corp., 458 A.2d 805, 816 (Md. 1983).
212 Dixon v. Process Corp., 382 A.2d 893, 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
213 Id. at 901; see also Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 39 A.3d 131, cert. denied, 426 Md. 428 (2012).
214 Inter-Tel Techs., Inc. v. Linn Station Props., LLC, 360 S.W.3d 152, 163-65 (Ky. 2012) (“[T]o the extent White can be read to
require evidence of actual fraud before an entity's veil is pierced, it is overruled.”); Misik v. D'Arco, 130 Cal. Rprt. 3d 123,
130 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“Application of the alter ego doctrine does not depend upon pleading or proof of fraud.”) (quoting
Eng'g Serv. Corp. v. Longridge Inv. Co., 314 P.2d 563, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957)).
215 Oh, supra note 14, at 137-39.
216 See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.201, 208 (1990) (“Fear
of juries leads defendants to settle suits, whatever their merits.”); Jason Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61
EMORY L.J. 1331, 1349 (2012) (“It is not clear how the injection of these values affects outcomes, though one might speculate
that a jury's willingness to award higher damage awards might increase settlement amounts.”); D. Brock Hornby, The Business
of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREENBAG 453, 455 (2007) (“But the desire to control costs (among insurers in particular)
and a fear of jury unpredictability or break-the-company verdicts provoke greater defense willingness to mediate, arbitrate,
or settle rather than bear the risk and extraordinary expense of trial.”).
217 Oh, supra note 14, at 115; Thompson, supra note 12, at 1051-52.
218 Id.
219 Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form--Should the Corporate Veil Be Pierced?, 64 UMKC L. REV. 311, 331 (1995) (“Several
state courts have held that the issue of piercing the corporate veil is one which may be resolved by the jury. These states
include Tennessee, Mississippi, North Dakota, North Carolina, Iowa, Florida, Texas, and Georgia, as well as the District
of Columbia.”).
220 Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. 1986); Brent Lee, Veil Piercing and Actual Fraud Under Article 2.21 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 427, 445 (2002) (citing Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978)); see also Oliver v. Marsh, 899 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)).
221 See, e.g., Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Drilcon, Inc. v. Roil Energy Corp., Inc 749 P.2d 1058 (Mont.
1988); Bakke v. D & A Landscaping Co., 820 N.W.2d 357 (N.D. 2012).
222 VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 109 P.3d 714, 723 (Idaho 2005) (“That even though the jury may find Dakota committed the
fraudulent act they may still find Durkin personally liable if they believe Dakota and Durkin are the same entity as provided
in their instructions”); Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 114 P.3d 974, 979 (Idaho 2005); Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes,
450 So. 2d 1114, 1121 (Fla. 1984) (“The record here indicates there was evidence which, if accepted by the jury, tended to show
that Dania and Carrousel operated independently of each other.”); Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 333 (N.C. 1985) (“Since
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Cir. 1981))).
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
VEIL-PIERCING'S PROCEDURE, 67 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1001
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 48
329 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 95 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.1685 (1976).
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